for the war and the present condition of Vietnam rests with the National Liberation Front and Hanoi. Nevertheless, we believe that a solution achieved by military victory alone, if that were possible, would subvert the interests of security, justice and peace, and therefore would not serve the best interests of the U.S.A. We believe, therefore, that the following steps should be taken:

(a) We ask that the U.S. make clear to the newly elected government in Saigon the necessity of large-scale, convincing efforts to establish social justice in South Vietnam, and the necessity of prompt efforts to secure a just, peaceful settlement with the National Liberation Front and Hanoi. It is essential, in our view, that the U.S. declare that the Government of Vietnam should take its own initiatives and make its own decisions to secure an early, peaceful settlement of the future of Vietnam. We urge that the U.S. pledge its support of all such efforts. In the absence of such efforts, we urge the U.S. Government to re-examine its commitments in Vietnam.

(b) As the General Assembly of the UN is about to convene, we ask that there be a shift in U.S. policy at two points. The first is to stop the bombing of North Vietnam for an unspecified period of time. The second is, simultaneously with the first, to request the UN (preferably the General Assembly) or other international agency to take up the question: What steps should be taken and procedures adopted to secure a peaceful settlement in Vietnam? The newly introduced Senate resolution concerning reference of the Vietnam issue to the UN deserves popular support.

Such a change in policy, we believe, would help create a situation on the world scene and in Vietnam that would assist in securing a peaceful settlement of the war. As the United States takes these steps, we believe it should clearly restate its desire for an early peaceful settlement and its willingness to withdraw its military forces upon reasonable assurance of the security of the area involved. We believe that the highest morality now urgently requires the compromises which will produce a peaceful settlement and help secure conditions for the establishment of freedom and justice. We believe that U.S. moral strength will now be shown not by continuing a massive military program, but by making efforts toward peace which, though they may involve risk, are imaginative, sustained and credible. We support the positions of those in Congress and in the Administration who have clearly advocated these objectives.

In the urgency of our situation in September, 1967, we call upon all Christians to communicate effectively their views to the officials of our Government. The General Board determines to commence the process of implementation of this resolution, under the leadership of the President of the NCC as follows:

(1) A representative group from the Executive Committee of the General Board, and others as deemed necessary by the President of the NCC, will present officially and in person to the highest officials of the United States of America and the Congress, the positions of the NCC on Vietnam.

(2) Each member communion through its appropriate officers and agencies will be requested specifically to witness to their support of the positions of the NCC on Vietnam by implementing in their respective communions the suggestions which follow and through other methods, in order that members of the churches may express their conviction on Vietnam. This request will be made also to councils of churches and church women.

to intensify their efforts to secure study, debate and action among their membership.

to seek out those in their membership who are prepared to act on these matters, calling them together in localities, regions, and nationally for the purpose of common action.

to secure actions about Vietnam from all possible church meetings, judicatories, and assemblies, and to publicize them.

to use available time on radio and TV for the purpose of debate concerning Vietnam.

to raise question with government officials and to inform them of their views, in face-to-face discussions or by letter or telegram. At this time, the Senate Concurrent Resolution 44 on reference to the UN, and a policy of deescalation are subjects of particular importance.

We also ask that urgent attention be given to the important Christian witness involved in the response of church members to Vietnam Christian Service, as part of the program of Church World Service. Such direct relief aid to the war sufferers in Vietnam demonstrates the moral sensitivity of Christian Americans and helps the cause of genuine reconciliation needed in the process of peace negotiaions and especially of the eventual rehabilitation of the country.

Senator CLARK. Would the Senator yield briefly?
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

INTRODUCTION OF DR. ELTON ATWATER

Senator CLARK. Dr. Elton Atwater of University Park, Pa., is one of my constituents and a personal friend. It will be impossible for me to come back this afternoon as I must go to Philadelphia to make a speech.

I would like, if I might, Mr. Chairman, to place in the record a brief statement about Dr. Atwater's qualifications, and express my regret to him that I will not be able to be here to hear his testimony. I have, however, Doctor, read your excellent paper and find myself in accord with its conclusions.

Dr. Atwater is presently a professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University. He came to Pennsylvania State originally from American University. Before that, he had a distinguished academic career at American University, at the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Geneva, and as an associate professor of political science in both Elmira College and American University.

He is the associate director of the Quaker program at the United Nations; past director and is presently serving on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation.

It was my pleasure last Sunday to speak before the United Nations Committee at State College and to address the group with respect to the 22d anniversary of the United Nations.

Dr. Atwater and his wife were very active indeed in persuading me to go up there and in making the arrangements for what was a very successful meeting.

I am sure the committee will be most interested in the testimony that Dr. Atwater will give us, and I regret very much that I cannot be here to hear him.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Senator Clark.

The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator MORSE (presiding). The hearing will come to order. Senator Clark this morning introduced Dr. Elton Atwater. I want to associate myself with the introductory remarks and I want to insert in the record at this point, Mr. Reporter, a biographic sketch of Dr. Atwater.

(The biographic sketch of Dr. Atwater follows :)

ELTON ATWATER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY

ACADEMIC TRAINING

B.A. University of Rochester, 1934

M.A. The American University, Washington, D.C., 1936

Ph. D. The American University, 1939.

Diploma from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, 1938

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Elmira College, 1939–1943

Director, Foreign Service Training Program, American Friends Service Committee, 1946-1947

Associate Professor of International Affairs, The American University, Washington, D.C. 1947-1950

Associate Professor of Political Science, the Pennsylvania State University, 1950– 1957; Professor of Political Science here since 1957.

Head of the Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, 1956-1957 and 1960-1963. Associate Director of the Quaker United Nations Program, New York City, and Non-Governmental Organization Representative accredited to the U.N. Economic and Social Council, 1957-1959. Responsibilities included the exploration of various ways whereby greater use might be made of U.N. programs in the field of technical assistance, economic development, and social welfare services. Since 1964, has been developing and directing a U.N. Intern Program for Penn State graduate students under which the latter work as research aides in U.N. Delegations and other offices for one or two terms.

PUBLICATIONS

(Co-author) World Affairs, Problems and Prospects. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958.

American Regulation of Arms Exports. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1941.

Contributor of articles on international relations to the 1964 edition of the World Book Encyclopedia.

Have presented statements on several occasions before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C. on foreign aid legislation and legislation relating to the United Nations.

Contributor of articles to the American Journal of International Law, the Public Opinion Quarterly, Christian Century, and Friends Journal.

(Co-author) World Tensions: Conflict and Accommodation (New York, AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1967).

Senator MORSE. For those in attendance, I want to say that we are about to listen to one of the experts in the field of international law. We are delighted, Professor Atwater, to have you with us. You may proceed in your own way.

STATEMENT OF ELTON ATWATER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY

Mr. ATWATER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Elton Atwater. I am professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University. I am here today on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Although this committee is widely representative of the views of many Friends or Quakers, it is not authorized to speak for all members of the Religious Society of Friends. No single organization is authorized to do this.

SUPPORT FOR MORSE RESOLUTION

I speak today in general support of the resolution, which you introduced, Mr. Chairman. calling on the President to request United Nations action on the Vietnam conflict through the Security Council or, if this is impossible, through the General Assembly.

The President has repeatedly stressed his desire for peace in Vietnam and said that he or his representatives would meet any time, any place, and with anyone authorized to engage in meaningful discussions on ending the conflict. As recently as last Monday, October 23, 1967, following the antiwar demonstrations in Washington, D.C., he said:

In every way we can, we search for peace in Vietnam. But we appear to be searching alone.

Your resolution offers a means of broadening that search by enlisting the help of the great majority of United Nations members who are also deeply disturbed by the Vietnam war, who do not feel that the problem can be solved by military measures, and who support the effort to bring both sides to the conference table.

VIETNAM CONFLICT SHOULD HAVE GONE TO U.N. LONG AGO

The Vietnam conflict should have been taken to the United Nations long ago before the President authorized U.S. military forces to engage in combat operations. Unlike the case of the Korean war, there has been no United Nations or international finding of "aggression" in Vietnam, and no U.N. or international authorization of military action. There have only been charges and countercharges of "aggression" by both sides, with each side apparently expecting the rest of the world to take its claims at face value.

No careful lawyer or judge would base his conclusions on the claims or statements of one party to the dispute, but this is in effect what we have been doing by not having earlier sought the United Nations authorization and action to deal with the Vietnam problem. Admittedly, the Vietnam case is much more complicated than that of Korea, involving initially charges of indirect aggression and subversion rather than direct military attack. But if the United States had had a really strong case, it should have been willing to let the United Nations evaluate it. And even if the Security Council had been unable to act because of a veto, more vigorous initiatives by the United States in the General Assembly might have produced a sufficient consensus to enable U.N. representatives to have exercised a moderating or mediating influence earlier in the conflict.

INITIATION OF STEPS TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE

But there is little to be gained now in attempting to assess responsibility for past failures. What is important at the moment is to initiate steps to achieve a cease-fire and to open negotiations looking toward some kind of settlement under which South Vietnam can freely establish its own internal political institutions, with international guarantees of its security and with international assistance for its economic rehabilitation and development.

I believe the United Nations can be helpful in initiating such action provided that the United States gives convincing evidence that it is prepared to reduce the level of military activity and enter into meaningful discussions.

SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO HALT
BOMBING

At this point I would like to depart from my prepared statement long enough to agree with what was so ably said this morning by Mr. Gross as to the importance of accompanying the announcement of taking the case to the Security Council with a simultaneous announcement of our willingness to halt the bombing and to negotiate with all parties, including the National Liberation Front.

The United Nations is no superpower, and there are many severe limitations on what it can do, arising from the veto power in the Security Council and the fact that Communist China and North Vietnam do not sit in the United Nations and are strongly opposed at this moment to U.N. involvement.

As recently as September 16, 1967, Secretary General U Thant said at a press conference:

I would be the happiest man if the Security Council were in a position to contribute toward the settlement of the Vietnam problem . But the plain fact is that in matters of that nature involving peace-keeping, the Security Council will not act and cannot act in the face of opposition of one permanent member. That has been the experience of the United Nations in the last twenty-two years.

ROLE OF SECRETARY GENERAL

I might add at this point, Mr. Chairman, that it has been a little difficult for some of us like yourself who have been urging that the U.N. take up this matter, to find that the Secretary General has felt this was not a wise course of action. It has not been easy to maintain this point in the face of a position of this sort, and yet in view of the political realities which exist at the United Nations, the Secretary General, of course, has a very strong case.

Senator MORSE. May I say, Professor, that, when the Secretary General makes those statements, I always remember he is not the United Nations, just an officer of it, and the questions of policy, after all, rest for final determination not in his office but, in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

When I say that I do not in any way reflect against him. I have great admiration and respect for him. I happen to think that we must insist through the Security Council and the General Assembly that policy be formulated and then call upon the Secretary General to execute it.

Mr. ATWATER. I agree with you, and I feel that frequently member governments, our own Government in particular because of its tremendous influence, can often make the job of the Secretary General much easier by taking a stronger, more vigorous position in support of U.N. action. I hope we will do so in this case, and I think there is the opportunity here, as I am about to argue, to do exactly that.

IMPORTANCE OF GETTING SOVIET AGREEMENT

I do believe that simply referring the conflict to the Security Council or the General Assembly may not be very productive unless the Soviet Union modifies its present opposition to U.N. involvement in this case, and unless it also agrees to help get North Vietnam to the conference table.