purposes an abstention is the same as a no and the no is the same as an abstention on procedural matters. On a substantive matter a no vote by the Soviet Union would be a veto and that would end the matter as far as the Council's decision is concerned.

Let me point out that a number of the favorable votes on inscription were cast on the understanding that the Council would not proceed forthwith to consider the matter substantively, but that instead informal consultations would be held as to the future course of action. Only on this basis was it possible to obtain the necessary nine votes for inscription.

Accordingly, immediately after the vote the President of the Council who was then, my colleague, Ambassador Matsui of Japan, adjourned the Council with the consent of the members so that the agreed-upon consultations could be held, and very intensive consultations were then held by Ambassador Matsui very skillfully over the three weeks that followed. He summed up the results of these consultations in a letter to the members of the Council dated February 26. He reported that he had found differences of view among the members, principally on, and I quote him, "the wisdom of the Council considering the problem of Vietnam at this particular juncture." He added that these differences had "given rise to a general feeling that it would be inopportune for the Council to hold further debate at this time."

AMBASSADOR MATSUI'S LETTER

Ambassador Matsui's entire letter is pertinent to the committee's inquiry, and with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to submit it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be included.

(The letter referred to follows:)

LETTER DATED 26 FEBRUARY 1966 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter dated 26 February 1966, addressed by me to the members of the Security Council. I should be grateful if Your Excellency would kindly have this letter reproduced as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) AKIRA MATSUI, President of the Security Council.

As you know, at the 1273rd meeting of the Security Council on 2 February 1966, following the adoption of the agenda for that meeting, namely, the letter dated 31 Janauary 1966, addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America (S/7105), I suggested that informal and private consultations be held in order to decide on the most effective and appropriate way of continuing our debate in the future, and that, to this end, the meeting be adjourned until an exact date and time could be arranged for the next meeting.

That suggestion was approved without objection and it was so decided by the Council.

Pursuant to that decision, I felt obliged, as President of the Council for the month of February, to make myself available in arranging the informal and private consultations envisaged by the Council in its decision. I have endeavoured to carry out this task with members of the Council both individually and collectively. I have also conferred with the Secretary-General, who has expressed to me his own views of the situation.

It is clear to me that members of the Council have every right to be informed of the results of these consultations. I feel, indeed, that it is my duty, as President of the Council, so to inform members.

A useful exchange of views has taken place; on the other hand, some serious differences of views remain unresolved.

The principal difference among members on the procedural question at issue relates to the wisdom of the Council considering the problem of Viet-Nam at this particular juncture. Although it was felt by a number of members that the Council might find some way to contribute towards a solution of the Viet-Nam problem, others took the position that consideration of the problem in the forum of the Council would not be useful under present circumstances; some members, adhering to positions they had expressed when adoption of the provisional agenda was discussed on 1 and 2 February, did not choose to participate in consultations.

These differences of views have made it impossible for me to report, at this stage, agreement on a precise course of action the Council might follow. They have also given rise to a general feeling that it would be inopportune for the Council to hold further debate at this time and, rather than a formal meeting of the Council, a report by me in the present form has appeared to be the most appropriate step that could be taken. I have decided, therefore, to take this step under the present extraordinary circumstances.

It would not be appropriate for me to refer, in a formal and public document such as this, to the views that individual members expressed in the course of informal and private consultations. Nevertheless, throughout the Council's proceedings of 1 and 2 February and the consultations stemming therefrom, I believe I could detect a certain degree of common feeling among many members of the Council which might be summarized as follows:

1. There is general grave concern and growing anxiety over the continuation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and a strong desire for the early cessation of hostilities and a peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam problem;

2. There appears also to be a feeling that the termination of the conflict in Viet-Nam should be sought through negotiations in an appropriate forum in order to work out the implementation of the Geneva Accords.

It is my understanding that the Council, having decided on 2 February to place on its agenda the item contained in the letter dated 31 January by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America (S/7105), remains seized of the Viet-Nam problem.

May I conclude by expressing my personal hope that efforts will be continued, within and outside of the United Nations, by whatever means may be deemed appropriate, to find an early, peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam question.

I am requesting the Secretary-General to reproduce this letter as an official document of the Council.

I avail myself, etc.

(Signed) AKIRA MATSUI, President of the Security Council.

ATTITUDE OF COUNCIL MEMBERS TOWARD DEBATE

Ambassador GOLDBERG. It is important to note also, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, that the Soviet Union and Bulgaria refused throughout to even join in the consultations which Ambassador Matsui held among the Council members. The Soviet representative, Ambassador Fedorenko, sent a letter to the President of the Council stating his "strong objections" to the procedure followed by Ambassador Matsui, and charging him with "steps that go beyond the limit of his confidence and violate the Security Council's rules of procedure and established practice." A similar letter was also sent by the Bulgarian representative. I need scarcely add, Mr. Chairman, that in our view and I think in the view of many members of the Council Ambassador Matsui acted quite properly in doing what he did and quite within his authority as President of the Council in reporting to the members of the Council the results of his consultations.

My own canvass taken independently of that of Ambassador Matsui confirmed his assessment that the members of the Council were generally unwilling to proceed with a substantive discussion despite the strong and express preference of the United States that we get on

with the debate. I should also like to add we did have somewhat of a substantive debate as happens in the U.N. even in the process of inscribing an item. I made a statement of a substantive character in support of inscription because I could hardly avoid it, and other members spoke to the substance in dealing with the inscription matter as is apparent from the record you have kindly allowed me to file with the committee.

Indeed my canvass showed that this unwillingness to get on with the debate was found even among those members who had voted affirmatively on inscription in the hope that such a vote might sway the negative attitude of the Soviet Union and France in particular.

U.S. CANVASS ON COUNCIL MOOD TO RENEW VIETNAM CONSIDERATION

Since that time, a year and a half ago-it seems to me a very long time, Mr. Chairman, in light of our work at the U.N.-my associates and I at the U.S. mission have periodically reviewed the possibility of renewed consideration of Vietnam by the Security Council. We made a particular point of this during the Tet bombing pause at the beginning of 1967. This also happened to be the time when several of the nonpermanent seats on the Council changed hands, and we engaged in detailed consultations with the members just coming on the Council as well as with those remaining on the Council. But the results of this canvass were no more encouraging than those that had preceded it.

Then, as recently as September of this year, scarcely two months ago, and largely at the initiative of Senator Mansfield and Senator Morse who indicated, as they have previously, strong interest in this matter, at the request of the President I once again conducted an intensive canvass of the members of the Security Council. In these informal consultations in order to attempt to meet the point of view of those who in 1966 had argued that inscription was not desirable because of the competence of the Geneva machinery, we discussed the possibility of Council action, either on the resolution we had offered in January 1966 or on a new formulation. Now the new formulation was designed to take into more specific account the views of those who had argued that the Geneva Conference was the proper forum, not the U.N., and this new draft was as follows:

The Security Council,

Having considered the problem of Vietnaın,

Deeply concerned at the situation in Vietnam and the threat it posses to international peace and security,

Believing in the principle of the inviolability of, and respect for, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states,

Convinced that a solution to this problem is to be found through political and not military means, and that a peaceful solution should be found through negotiations,

Considering, that the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 constitute a workable basis for peace in Southeast Asia.

1. Reaffirms, on the basis of the Geneva Agreements, the following principles: (a) That there should be a complete cease-fire and disengagement by all armed personnel throughout North and South Vietnam at an agreed upon date. (b) That there should be no military forces or bases maintained or supported in North and South Vietnam other than those under the control of the respective governments, and all other troops and armed personnel should be withdrawn or demobilized, and all other military bases abolished as quickly as possible and in accordance with an agreed time schedule, during which introductions of additional armed personnel should be prohibited. 85-837-67-11

(c) That the international frontiers of the states bordering on North and South Vietnam and the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam should be fully respected.

(d) That the question of reunification of Vietnam should be settled peacefully by the Vietnamese people in both North and South Vietnam, without any foreign interference.

(e) That there should be international supervision of the foregoing through such machinery as may be agreed upon.

2. Calls for the convening of an international conference for the purpose of establishing a permanent peace in Southeast Asia based upon the principles of the Geneva Agreements.

I regret to report that this recent canvass, once again shows a general unwillingness for the Security Council either to resume its consideration of the agenda item and draft resolution which we proposed in early 1966, or to consider this new draft, or to take any other action on the matter.

COMMENTS OF HANOI, PEKING, AND NLF ON U.N. INVOLVEMENT

It is relevant at this point, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, at this point to note the attitudes of Hanoi and Peking, as well as the National Liberation Front, toward United Nations involvement in the search for peace in Vietnam. All of these have made known their views on the subject many times. I shall cite only a few representative examples, although I have a more comprehensive summary which, with your permission, I shall file with the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. In late January 1966, the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister declared:

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam reaffirms once again that on the international plane, the consideration of the United States war acts in Vietnam falls within the competence of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina and not the United Nations Security Council. Any resolution by the United Nations Security Council intervening in the Vietnam question will be null and void. In June 1966, the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry said:

The United Nations has absolutely no competence in the Vietnam problem. The fact that the Saigon puppet administration, at U.S. bidding, proposed that the United Nations send its observers to supervise the election farce in South Vietnam is completely illegal and runs counter to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and international law.

Then in September 1966, the Premier of North Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, said in a speech:

On the occasion of the current session of the United Nations General Assembly, they are trying again to use the United Nations as an instrument for their agressive policy in Vietnam. But the United Nations has absolutely no right whatsoever to intervene in the Vietnam issue.

And recently, when I was conducting soundings in late August and early September of this year among members of the Security Council, and this fact became known, through statements made by other people, other than ourselves where we consulted very broadly as we had been, Hanoi's major daily, Nhan Dan, which reflects the official view, said:

The United States ruling circles are actively trying to get the United Nations to interfere in the Vietnam problem on the occasion of the forthcoming 22d Session of the United Nations General Assembly. United States delegate to the

United Nations Arthur Goldberg has met a number of representatives of various countries ***.

The Vietnamese people have many times clearly stated that the United Nations has no right whatsoever to interfere in Vietnam. The Vietnam question can only be settled on the basis of the four-point stand of the DRV Government and the five-point stand of the NFLSV

The position of the National Liberation Front has been identical with that of Hanoi, as illustrated by the following statement by the central committee of the front on February 2, 1966:

The NFLSV is determined to expose before the public the United States imperialists' perfidious plot to hide behind the United Nations flag to accelerate the aggressive war in South Vietnam and the war of destruction against North Vietnam. The NFLSV solemnly declares: The United Nations has no right to make decisions concerning the affairs of the South Vietnamese people.

A similar attitude has been expressed by the Peking government, as can be seen in the following examples.

In April 1965, the People's Daily in Peking ran an editorial which stated:

The Vietnam question has nothing to do with the United Nations. The 1954 Geneva agreements were reached outside the United Nations and the latter has no right whatsoever to interfere in the affairs of Vietnam and Indochina. It is the duty of the countries participating in the Geneva conference to safeguard the Geneva agreements and no meddling by the United Nations is called for, nor will it be tolerated. This is the case today as it was in the past, and so will it remain in the future.

Then, on August 7, 1965-just as I was holding my first consultations with members of the Security Council-the People's Daily said in an editorial:

It is *** clear to everyone that the United Nations has no right whatever to meddle in the Vietnam question, nor can it solve the issue. The Vietnam question has nothing to do with the United Nations.

We have many other statements from Peking to the same effect, including some of quite recent date, which are included in the document which you have kindly given me permission to file. (The summary referred to follows:)

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS OF HANOI, PEKING, AND NLF ON U.N. INVOLVEMENT IN SEARCH FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM

LIBERATION FRONT STATEMENTS ON THE VIETNAM QUESTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

September 20, 1965.-Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 2330 GMT 20 September 1965.

The Liberation Front attached the US in a commentary entitled "What is purpose of US in making approaches to bring Vietnamese problems before United Nations." The Front charged that, since Johnson's other attempts to "sell the false goods of peace negotiations" have failed, he has now sought to bring the Vietnam problem before the United Nations. The Liberation Radio also alleged that "Johnson intends to use the UN intervention in Vietnam as a means for the US imperialists to withdraw from the present impasse," and that Johnson hopes through "the UN organization, which is controlled by the United States, he will obtain a resolution condemning the Vietnamese people and legalizing the participation of a number of new countries in the dirty war." Finally, the Front claimed that its statement of 22 March 1965 provided "rational and reasonable basis" for settlement, and "apart from that, the South Vietnamese people will not recognize any decision of any organization which wants to solve problems in another way."