in the newspaper was that our new justification for this was to resist what the Secretary maintains is Asian communism, going beyond even Vietnam communism or any specific communism. He expresses it in purely ideological terms, and it confuses me, at least, as to just what is our attitude toward the nature of the conflict. It may have a very significant bearing upon whether or not a solution can be found. If it is an ideological conflict, then these other considerations of national interest may have different bearing upon our proper policy. RHETORIC OF THE ADMINISTRATION And the rhetoric of the Administration, it seems to me, often includes this language of the Communists. When we refer to the people we kill, we don't say we killed Vietnamese or we killed human beings, it is we killed Communists as if they were a kind of species quite different from other human beings. I don't think it helps clarify the problem. I am not sure it is your responsibility to clarify this, but it was brought up and I wondered if you could help us a bit. Ambassador GOLDBERG. Mr. Chairman, and Senator Gore, I don't think it is appropriate for me nor do I think the Secretary of State needs an explanation or defense on his part. He is the Secretary of State and I am the American representative at the United Nations. He can speak for himself. The remark I made about the Hanoi regime was in the discussion about neutrality and I was trying to answer to that and I said-you undoubtedly agreed with what I said that the Hanoi regime is a Communist regime. They don't deny that and I didn't say it in any other context. I quoted the speech I made which was made with the authority of the American Government. I cannot make any speeches other than with the full authority of our Government as an expression of our policy when I made it, and as something I agree with. And beyond that, I do not think it is appropriate for me to go. DEFINITION OF A COMMUNIST COUNTRY The CHAIRMAN. Yugoslavia, I might note, calls itself a nonalined country. I am not quite sure what the distinction is between that and a neutral country. I am not fully aware of her treaties of defense with other Communist countries. She, in recent years, led a move of some 17 nonalined countries, seeking a solution of the Vietnamese war, didn't she? Ambassador GOLDBERG. Yes, and we responded to that favorably. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. So it doesn't necessarily follow that a Communist country cannot be either neutral or nonalined, does it? Senator MCCARTHY. I just want to say that I don't think we ought to press the Ambassador." The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to press him. I raise it because Senator Symington raised it as a question for consideration. Senator MCCARTHY. We do have problems of definition here. When we get the Secretary of State sometime we will try to get an initial interpretation of meaning so we can understand better ourselves. We don't understand it is necessary for the Ambassador, as properly as you have conducted yourself, as you always do as Ambassador, to answer. The CHAIRMAN. I don't wish to press the Ambassador. It is a question, however, that arises in connection with what we should do. Senator MCCARTHY. I would like to ask him another question about a word, but I won't. I see that the Secretary stated in his press conference on the 12th, he talked about the Chinese as pursuing what he called ideological adventure. I know that is different from the adventures that the Vice President talked about the other day. It is an unusual coincidence. PRESSING FOR A VOTE IS URGED The CHAIRMAN. I want to strongly urge that you press for a vote. I understand that is your position. In other words do not let the fact that you fear you may not get nine votes deter you from asking for a vote. If you don't get but one vote I would prefer that to no vote. I again say I think that, under present conditions, this is the best possible approach I can think of that you are proposing to follow. SUBMISSION OF PROBLEM TO U.N. UNDER SEATO TREATY Lastly, I wish to submit questions regarding another matter which relates to taking this matter to the U.N. I would respectfully ask that you comment upon them at your leisure afterward. I don't want to take the time this morning. It has to do with why our Government, not you, did not submit this matter immediately under the SEATO Treaty, article 1, to the United Nations Security Council. I don't want to take your time now so the questions will be given to you. In the meantime, I will submit for the record an exchange of letters with the Department of State bearing on this question. It is of interest to the committee. (The letters referred to follow :) Hon. DEAN RUSK, MAY 9, 1967. DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In view of the Administration's position that our involvement in Vietnam is pursuant to a commitment under the Southeast Asia Treaty, questions have arisen concerning the reports to the Security Council required under paragraph 1, Article 4, of action taken under that provision. It would be helpful to the Committee in evaluating the applicability of the treaty if you could provide us with answers to the following questions: 1. Has SEATO as an organization submitted a report to the Security Council of measures taken under paragraph 1? 2. The United States has taken the position that it is committed to act individually in the event of armed attack. Does the Department consider that we are also committed to report such action to the Security Council in the absence of a formal report by SEATO as an organization? 3. Has the United States submitted reports to the Security Council specifically referring to fulfillment of the reporting requirement? If so, when? 4. Have Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines or Thailand submitted reports to the Security Council pursuant to the treaty provision? Sincerely yours, J. W. FULBRIGHT, Chairman. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of May 9, concerning reports to the UN Security Council under paragraph 1, Article 4, of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. The United States, in keeping with Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 4, paragraph 1 of the SEATO Treaty, has periodically informed the UN Security Council about the actions we have taken in Viet-Nam. In addition, the United States, as you know, has twice requested the UN Security Council formally to consider the Viet-Nam situation. The following comments are in response to your specific questions: 1. Has SEATO as an organization submitted a report to the Security Council of measures taken under paragraph 1? Response: Under Article 4, paragraph 1, each Party to the Treaty assumes certain obligations in accordance with its constitutional procedures. The Article provides that: "Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations." The sentence does not specify by whom the reporting is to be done. SEATO, as an organization, has not acted under Article 4, paragraph 1, and there has been no occasion for the organization to make reports to the Security Council. 2. The United States has taken the position that it is committed to act individually in the event of an armed attack. Does the Department consider that we are also committed to report such action to the Security Council in the absence of a formal report by SEATO as an organization? Response: The United States has taken the position that its obligation under the SEATO Treaty to act in accordance with its constitutional processes to meet the common danger of Communist armed attack is individual as well as collective. The Department of State considers that the United States has an obligation both under the SEATO Pact and the UN Charter to ensure that measures taken by it under Article 4, paragraph 1 of the SEATO Treaty are reported to the UN Security Council and we believe that our reports have met these obligations. 3. Has the United States submitted reports to the Security Council specifically referring to fulfillment of the reporting requirement? If so, when? Response: The communications from the United States Government to the United Nations regarding US actions and policies in Viet-Nam have not specifically cited either Article 51 of the United Nations Charter or Article 4, paragraph 1 of the SEATO Treaty, but they have been submitted in fulfillment of these obligations. Neither provision would appear to require that specific citations be made in a report. I am enclosing a paper which summarizes various reports and approaches to the United Nations on Viet-Nam. The measures which the United States has taken to inform and involve the Security Council in particular appear at items 5, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12. In addition, the United States Government has attempted to keep both the General Assembly and the Secretary General fully informed on Viet-Nam, as reflected by items 10, and 13 through 16. 4. Have Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines or Thailand submitted reports to the Security Council pursuant to the Treaty provision? Response: Insofar as we are aware, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand have not submitted separate reports to the UN Security Council concerning their action in meeting the common danger in Viet-Nam. The policies of these governments in the Viet-Nam situation have been made clear to members of the United Nations, particularly in their addresses during the debates of the General Assembly. If I can be of further assistance at any time, please do not hesitate to let me know. Sincerely yours, WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. [Enclosure] UN INVOLVEMENT IN VIET-NAM 1. Thai Complaint Against Viet-Minh Activities On May 29, 1954, Thailand brought the situation in Indo-China to the attention of the Security Council, stating that Viet Minh forces remained in Laos and Cambodia with the intention of overthrowing the legal governments of these states. A Thai draft resolution requesting the aid of the Peace Observation Commission was vetoed by the Soviet Union. 2. Question of Laos On September 4, 1959, the Foreign Minister of Laos asked for the assistance of the United Nations to halt aggression along the northeast frontier of Laos by elements from North Viet-Nam. The next day the Security Council met and adopted a procedural resolution asking that a sub-committee composed of Argentina, Italy, Japan, and Tunisia visit Laos and report to the Council on the situation there. The sub-committee visited Laos between September 15 and October 13, 1959. Its report stated that the military actions in Laos were of a "guerrilla nature" but that it appeared that certain of the hostile operations "must have a centralized coordination." The UN Secretary-General also visited Laos in November 1959 in order to inform himself fully on this problem. The SC took no further action. 3. Question of Human Rights in South Viet-Nam On September 4, 1963, fourteen United Nations Members requested the inclusion in the agenda of the 18th General Assembly of an item entitled the "Violation of Human Rights in South Viet-Nam." After inscription of the item, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam extended through the President of the General Assembly and the UN Secretary-General an invitation to the representatives of several Member states to visit Viet-Nam to determine the real situation regarding the relationships between the Government and the Buddhist community of Viet-Nam. In response, the President of the Assembly on August 11, 1963, announced the appointment of a Mission composed of Afghanistan, Brazil, Ceylon, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Morocco, and Nepal. The Commission visited South Viet-Nam from October 24 to November 3, 1963, and conducted numerous hearings on this question. Before the Mission completed its work, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam was overthrown. The Mission submitted a lengthy report to the General Assembly dated December 7, 1963. The report did not, however, set forth any general conclusions regarding the charges against the Vietnamese Government. The Assembly took no further action. 4. Cambodia-Viet-Nam Border In May 1964, Cambodia complained to the UN Security Council of South Vietnamese military incursions into Cambodian territory. At that time the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam suggested that some form of UN presence might be established on the border. The Security Council sent a mission of three of its members (Brazil, Ivory Coast, Morocco) to examine the border situation and make recommendations as to how such incidents could be voided. These recommendations included a UN observer group to be stationed on the Cambodian side of the frontier. The Cambodia Government announced it could not accept the Mission's report or its recommendations to the Council. 5. Tonkin Gulf In August 1964, the United States requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider the serious situation created by North Vietnamese torpedo boat attacks on United States destroyers in international waters. In addition to hearing the U.S. complaint, the Council invited both North and South Vietnam to provide such information relating to the issue as they desired to make available, either by taking part in the Council's discussion or in whatever way they preferred. South Viet-Nam offered the Council its full cooperation. The Hanoi regime responded that the Security Council "has no right to examine the problem" and that any Security Council decision would be considered "null and void" by North Vietnamese authorities. The Council adjourned without taking further action on this matter. 6. Cambodian Charges of US/GVN Use of Poisonous Chemicals The Cambodian Government charged in a letter to the UN Security Council dated July 28, 1965, that South Vietnamese aircraft had dumped "toxic powder" on Cambodian territory, resulting in loss of life and damage to crops. The letter linked this operation to the "chemical warfare" conducted by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces in Viet-Nam. On August 3, the United States replied that no U.S. or South Vietnamese aircraft had conducted chemical operations of any character whatsoever at the places and times indicated in the Cambodian allegation. After the Cambodian Government renewed its charge, the United States requested in a letter to the Council dated August 14 that the Cambodian Government permit an impartial inquiry into the matter by a "qualified international body." The U.S. also suggested the the World Health Organization or the International Committee for the Red Cross would be well-qualified to carry out such an investigation and report the facts to the Security Council. The Cambodian Government rejected this proposal. 7. U.S. Letter to UN Security Council, February 7, 1965 On February 7, 1965, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson informed the Security Council by letter of further Viet Cong attacks against U.S. and South Vietnamese installations in South Viet-Nam and the prompt defensive action both Governments had agreed was necessary against certain military facilities in the southern portion of North Viet-Nam. The U.S. letter recalled that the Republic of Viet-Nam and at its request the United States and other governments were committed to resist the systematic aggression carried on by North Viet-Nam for more than six years across a frontier set by international agreement. The letter continued: "since reinforcement of the Viet Cong by infiltrators from North Viet-Nam is essential to this continuing aggression, counter-measures to arrest such reinforcement from the outside are a justified measure of self-defense." The United States, Ambassador Stevenson stated, deeply regretted that the Hanoi regime explicitly denied the right of the Security Council to examine the Vietnamese problem. The U.S. letter concluded that "our mission in Southeast Asia is peace and our purpose is to ensure respect for the peace settlement to which all concerned are committed. We therefore reserve the right to bring this matter to the Security Council if the situation warrants it." 8. U.S. Letter to UN Security Council, February 27, 1965 Ambassador Stevenson on February 27, 1965, transmitted to the Security Council the U.S. special report entitled "Aggression from the North, the Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam." After summarizing the nature of the aggressive war of conquest being waged by North Viet-Nam, the U.S. letter noted that peace could be restored quickly to Viet-Nam by a prompt and assured cessation of aggression by Hanoi against the Republic of VietNam. "In that event," stated Ambassador Stevenson, "my Government would be happy to withdraw its military forces from the Republic of Viet-Nam and turn promptly to an international effort to assist the economic and social development of Southeast Asia." 9. President Johnson's Call for Increased Developmental Effort On April 7, 1965, President Johnson at Johns Hopkins University called for "unconditional discussions" to settle the Vietnamese conflict. At the same time, the President proposed a massive effort to improve economic conditions in conflicttorn Southeast Asia. As a first step, he suggested that the countries of Southeast Asia associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development and expressed the hope that "North Viet-Nam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible." The President continued: "The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in this area and I would hope tonight that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development." A major step forward in this connection took place in Manila on December 4, 1965, when 27 countries, under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, agreed to establish an Asian Development Bank. Efforts are being made to accelerate the activities of the Mekong Coordinating Committee. Under the aegis of the UN's Economic Commission for Asia and the |