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SUBMISSION OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT TO THE

UNITED NATIONS

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1967

UNITED STATES SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:30 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator Mike Mansfield presiding. Present: Senators Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.

Senator MANSFIELD. The meeting will come to order.

The Committee on Foreign Relations is meeting this day to begin a series of hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution 44, which urges the United States to submit the Vietnam issue to the United Nations. This resolution has been submitted by the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon, Senator Morse, who, to the best of my knowledge, has been urging for at least 2 and possibly 3 years, that the matter of Vietnam be taken to the United Nations, and has been most consistent in that respect.

Yesterday, 54 Senators also introduced a resolution to the same subject.

(S. Con. Res. 44 and S. Res. 180 follow:)

[S. Con. Res. 44, 90th Cong., first sess.]

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas the United States is now fighting a major land war in Southeast Asia which threatens to widen into world war III and a nuclear holocaust which could destroy civilization; and

Whereas the primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security and to take collective measures to remove threats to world peace; and

Whereas in ratifying the charter of the United Nations the United States undertook a solemn treaty commitment to settle international disputes by peaceful means; and

Whereas under the charter the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace, which devolves to the General Assembly when the Council is unable to act; and

Whereas the United States has failed to take effective steps to bring about United Nations involvement which would bring an end to the conflict in Southeast Asia: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that:

1. The President should request an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider all aspects of the conflict in Vietnam and to act to end the conflict, pledging the United States in advance to accept and carry out any decision on the matter by the Council, in accordance with article 25 of the charter.

2. If the Security Council is unable to act, the United States should take all steps necessary to assure action on the issue by the General Assembly.

3. The United States objectives in the United Nations should be to obtain(a) support for an immediate cessation of hostilities by all parties, and

1

(b) recommendations for appropriate measures, such as the convening of an international conference, for reaching a permanent settlement which will assure a lasting peace for Southeast Asia.

[S. Res. 180, 90th Cong., first sess.]

RESOLUTION

Whereas the question of the Vietnamese conflict is a matter of which the Security Council of the United Nations is seized by action previously taken by the Council in connection with a letter of the Permanent Representative of the United States dated January 31, 1966, submitting a resolution seeking a settlement of the hostilities, and

Whereas more than one hundred members of the United Nations through their Chiefs of State or Foreign Ministers or Permanent Representatives have expressed their deep concern with the continued hostilities and their desire for a peaceful and honorable settlement of the Vietnamese conflict, therefore be it Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States consider taking the appropriate initiative through his representative at the United Nations to assure that the United States resolution of January 31, 1966, or any other resolution of equivalent purpose be brought before the Security Council for consideration.

OPENING STATEMENT

Senator MANSFIELD. The Chair believes that as we begin the discussion of the role the United Nations should or could play in the settlement of the war, we should bear in mind the charter of the U.N. and the solemn undertakings it contains. The charter states that the peoples of the United Nations will strive "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international life can be maintained."

The charter also provides that it is the purpose of the United Nations "to maintain international peace and security."

I suggest that these are not mere words. They involve the most solemn of commitments. Unfortunately, they are all too often forgotten or overlooked. I realize that there are those who contend that the United Nations can have no part in the settlement of the Vietnam war. It is the purpose and intention of Senator Morse's resolution, however, that the United Nations not only can, but must, play a significant role in the resolution of this war. I think it would be well at this point to consider not only the cost to the United Nations if it should attempt to bring the Vietnamese war to a conclusion and fail, bu also the consequences for the future of the United Nations if it does not act at all.

Secretary General U Thant has said many times that it is not the charter of the U.N. that has failed the international community; it is the international community that has failed to live up to its responsibilities under the charter.

I suggest that the international community has thus far tragically failed its responsibilities to contribute to an honorable peace in Southeast Asia.

We meet this morning to take a careful look at the U.S. record in bringing this most dangerous of issues before the United Nations. We also look to the question of whether the United Nations can long survive if it does not live up to its responsibilities of maintaining international peace and security.

The first witness today is a man who needs no introduction to this committee. Mr. Cohen, it is a pleasure to have you take the witness chair and to make your presentation as you see fit.

(The biographic sketch of Mr. Cohen follows:)

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF MR. BENJAMIN V. COHEN, OF WASHINGTON, D.C. Born.-September 23, 1894, Muncie, Indiana.

Education.-University of Chicago, Ph.B. degree, 1914, and a J.D. degree, 1915; Harvard, S.J.D. degree, 1916.

Experience.-1916-17-Secretary to U.S. Circuit Judge; 1917-19-Attorney, U.S. Shipping Board; 1919-21-Counsel, American Zionists, Peace Conferences, London and Paris; 1922-33-Private practice in New York City; 1933-34Associate General Counsel, Public Works Administration; 1934-41-General Counsel, National Power Policy Commission; 1941-Adviser, American Ambassador to Great Britain; 1942-43-Assistant to Director, Office of Economic Stabilization; 1943-45-General Counsel, Office of War Mobilization; 1945-47— Counselor of the Department of State.

Conferences Attended and Other Activities.-Legal Adviser, International Monetary Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 1944; Member, American Delegation, Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 1944; Berlin Conference, 1945; Council of Foreign Ministers, London, 1945, Moscow, 1945 and 1947, Paris, 1946, New York City, 1946; Paris Peace Conference, 1946; Senior Adviser to American Delegation to United Nations General Assembly, London, New York City, 1946; Member of American Delegation to United Nations General Assembly, Paris 1948 and 1951, New York City, 1949, 1950 and 1952; U.S. Representative before International Court of Justice, The Hague, 1950; U.S. Representative on United Nations Disarmament Commission, 1952.

Memberships and Clubs.-Member, Phi Beta Kappa.

Publications.-"The United Nations Constitutional Development Growth and Possibilities," 1961.

STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN V. COHEN, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. COHEN. Chairman Mansfield, I appear here on the invitation of Chairman Fulbright and Senator Morse to give the committee my views on Senator Morse's proposed resolution and the role that the United Nations might play in the settlement of the Vietnam conflict.

Since being invited here and since preparing my remarks on the Morse resolution, a very important event occurred yesterday. That was the resolution introduced by Senator Mansfield which bore the sponsorship of 55 Senators, including Democrats, Republicans, Administration supporters, Administration dissenters. I think that resolution commanding the support of varied and opposing groups, all in uniting to find a U.N. solution of the Vietnam situation is one of the most important events that has occurred since the sad beginning of the Vietnam war.

UNITING OF ALL VIEWPOINTS

Throughout the war period, we have had too many splintered opinions, too much going it alone, and too little effort to seek a reconciliation of viewpoints nationally and internationally that could bring an end to the war. While it is not for me to determine the legislative strategy of the committee in dealing with the two resolutions, I myself would like to regard the Mansfield resolution as a prelude and not an alternative to the Mcrse resolution. I think nothing can be more helpful and conducive to U.N. action than a resolution coming

from Congress, uniting all elements in Congress, calling upon the Administration and the United Nations for action under the charter to end the war in Vietnam.

The resolution is a clarion call for action. It unites elements that have not been united for years, and it opens the possibility of our ceasing to go it alone in Vietnam, and of our sharing our responsibilities there as we should share them with the United Nations in accordance with the terms of the charter.

I hope, therefore, my remarks on Senator Morse's resolution, will not detract from your giving prompt and urgent support to the Mansfield resolution. The Morse resolution may later serve as valuable guidelines in the carrying out of the Mansfield resolution.

PURPOSES OF RESOLUTIONS

It would seem to me, that the Mansfield resolution like the Morse resolution serve two purposes:

In the first place, the resolution may remove doubts and misunderstanding on the part of other members of the United Nations which may account for the failure of the executive council to act on the matter on Vietnam at our request, and the resolutions may therefore enable the United Nations even at this late date to open ways toward a cease-fire, and peaceful negotiation and settlement. In the second place, they may serve to bring home to us our need of working with and through the United Nations and not alone in meeting the great problems in the international field under modern conditions.

DECLINE IN USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS

Having worked on the charter when it was being drafted, I have been deeply concerned by the perceptible decline in the use of the United Nations for the peaceful settlement or containment of international conflicts. The great powers seem content in many instances to use the United Nations as a diplomatic weapon in the cold war, but not as a means for finding peaceful solutions or accommodations of situations which threaten international peace. It is tragic that so little attention has been given in recent years to building up the peaceful settlement functions of the United Nations, particularly the mediating, conciliatory, factfinding processes of the United Nations. Difficult peaceful settlements cannot be achieved even in the United Nations by exclusive reliance on partisan debate and partisan voting. There has consequently been a growing tendency on the part of member states to take the law into their own hands and use or threaten to use force unilaterally without resort to the United Nations and in disregard of the charter limitations on the use of force.

TAYLOR-ROSTOW REPORT ON VIETNAM

Early in 1962, following the Taylor-Rostow report on Vietnam which first lead to the United States taking a limited but active role in the use of force in Vietnam, I was part of a small delegation from the American Association of the United Nations, consisting of Mrs. Roosevelt, Herman Steinkraus, Arthur Larsen, Norman Cousins, Clark Eichelberger, and myself, which came to the White House to urge the submission of the Vietnam question to the United Nations.

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