U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, OCTOBER 26, 1967 U.S. STATEMENTS ON THE NEED FOR UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL CRISES Cyprus: Remarks of President Johnson, March 4, 1964 "The United States Government will give full support to the efforts of the United Nations mediator in this direction, and we appeal to all peoples everywhere to join in their support. . . we have seen once again that men of good will can find means to keep peace if they are constructive about it and if they are determined to do it." 19: Remarks by Ambassador Stevenson, March 4, 1964, Statement made February once again the United Nations has demonstrated the indispensable role which it can play in serving the cause of peace." the urgent business before the Council and the responsibility of the Government of Cyprus is to restore communal peace and order and to stop the bloodshed. The sooner that we and the Security Council turn our attention to this the better it will be for all." Congo: Remarks by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, July 13, 1960 "The unfortunate sequence of events in the Congo which makes the speediest possible United Nations assistance imperative is well known to us all.” Hungary: Statement by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, October 28, 1956 "We in this Council cannot stand indifferent when such events take place. The Council must consider a situation so flagrantly contrary to the purpose and principles of the charter. We must consider carefully, in the light of developments, the steps this Council can appropriately take to help bring about an end to these repressions and to assist the Hungarian people in the enjoyment of their fundamental rights." Middle East: Remarks of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, September 26, 1956 "The United States welcomes the initiative which the Governments of the United Kingdom and France have taken in bringing the Suez Canal matter to the Security Council for its consideration." Letter from Ambassador Lodge to President of Security Council, October 29, 1956: "The situation makes imperative an immediate meeting of the Security Council, charged as it is with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as well as responsibility for the observance of the Armistice Agreement.' Statement by Ambassador Lodge in Security Council, October 30, 1956: "Failure by the Council to react at this time would be a clear avoidance of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Nations has a clear and unchallengeable responsibility for the maintenance of the armistice agreements. Korea: Statement by Ambassador Austin in the General Assembly, December 6, 1950: "The Security Council votes on the joint draft resolution on November 30. The resolution was not adopted, because of the negative vote of one of the permanent members, the Soviet Union. "It seems clear to the six sponsors of the joint draft resolution that no fruitful action can be expected, at this time, from the Security Council in view of this attitude of one of the permanent members. "Under these circumstances, the Governments which sponsored that resolution believe that the question of Communist intervention in Korea should be considered by the General Assembly as important and urgent matter. "The proposed agenda item puts before this Assembly one of the greatest questions faced by the United Nations. It may involve the whole future of the United Nations. It may involve the peace of the world. All the processes of the United Nations should be invoked in an effort to put an end to the threat to world peace." Middle East: Remarks of Ambassador Goldberg, May 23, 1967, Restated on June 6, 1967, before the Security Council "We have been consulting intensively with other members over the last several days, since the crisis first arose, to determine in what way the Security Council could best contribute to the cause of peace in the area. We entirely agree that the time has now come, in the light of the gravity of the circumstances, for the Security Council to discharge its primary responsibility under the charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. "It has been said, for example, that one of the possibly adverse effects of a discussion at this time would be to dramatize a situation better left quiet. Mr. President, this Council would have to be burying its head in the sand if it refused to recognize the threat to peace implicit in the developments which have occurred since our distinguished Secretary-General left New York two days ago. It is precisely because of these developments, not known to him nor to any member of the Council, that we have been called here today urgently to consider what the Council ought to do in discharge of its responsibility to further his efforts and not to impede them." U.S. LETTER AND RESOLUTION OF 1966 Senator MORSE. The Chair will also place in the record the U.S. letter of January 31, 1966, and a copy of the resolution that we finally sent to the Security Council which the Chair described this morning as a piece of paper with some words on it because, in the opinion of the Chair, only a resolution in which we commit outselves to abide by the jurisdiction of the Security Council of the General Assembly and waive any veto power at that time, will comply with our obligations under the charter. (The material referred to follows:) LETTER FROM ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTING AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TO CONSIDER THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM, JANUARY 31, 19661 His Excellency ROGER SEYDOUX, Dear Mr. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to request that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Vietnam. As you know, the U.S. Government has, time and time again, patiently and tirelessly sought a peaceful settlement of this conflict on the basis of unconditional negotiations and the Geneva Accords, of 1954. We have done so both inside and outside the United Nations. In President Johnson's letter of July 28, 1965, to the Secretary General, in my letter of July 30, 1965, to the President of the Security Council, and in my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General, we appealed for whatever help in ending the conflict the Security Council and its members or any other organ of the United Nations might be able to give. We have also been in constant touch with the Secretary General in order to keep him fully informed and to seek his counsel and assistance. A great number of United Nations members, acting jointly or separately, have with our earnest encouragement sought to find a means of moving the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. As you are also aware, because my Government was advised by many others that a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam might contribute to the acceptance by its Government of our offer of unconditional negotiations, we did suspend bombing on December 24 and continued that suspension for some 37 days. At the same time, President Johnson dispatched several high-ranking representatives to explain to His Holiness the Pope and to the chiefs of state or heads of government of a number of states our most earnest desire to end the conflict peacefully and promptly. Our views were set forth in 14 points which were communicated to a very large number of governments and later published and which were summarized in the third paragraph of my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General. 1 U.S. Mission to the United Nations press release No. 4798 dated Jan. 31, 1966. I should like to repeat that summary to you as follows: "That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples." Subsequently, the President in his state of the Union address on January 12 reiterated once again our willingness to consider at a conference or in other negotiations any proposals which might be put forward by others. I am authorized to inform the Council that these U.S. views were transmitted both directly and indirectly to the Government of North Vietnam and were received by that Government. Unhappily, there has been no affirmative response whatsoever from Hanoi to our efforts to bring the conflict to the negotiating table, to which so many governments lent their sympathy and assistance. Instead, there have been from Hanoi, and of course from Peiping as well, merely the familiar charges that our peace offensive, despite the prolonged bombing pause, was merely a "fraud" and a "swindle" deserving no serious consideration. The most recent response seemed to be that set forth in President Ho Chi Minh's letter to certain heads of state which was broadcast from Hanoi on January 28. In this letter President Ho Chi Minh made quite clear his unwillingness at this time to proceed with unconditional negotiations; on the contrary, he insisted on a number of preconditions which would in effect require the United States to accept Hanoi's solution before negotiations had even begun. This is obviously unacceptable. Therefore, Mr. President, my Government has concluded that it should now bring this problem with all its implications for peace formally before the Security Council. We are mindful of the discussions over the past months among the members of the Council as to whether a formal meeting could usefully be held in the context of other efforts than in train. We are also aware that it may not be easy for the Council itself, in view of all the obstacles, to take constructive action on this question. We are firmly convinced, however, that in light of its obligations under the Charter to maintain international peace and security and the failure so far of all efforts outside the United Nations to restore peace, the Council should address itself urgently and positively to this situation and exert its most vigorous endeavors and its immense prestige to finding a prompt solution to it. We hope that the members of the Security Council will agree that our common dedication to peace and our common responsibility for the future of mankind require no less. In this connection, we are mindful of the renewed appeal of His Holiness the Pope only 2 days ago in which he suggested that "an arbitration of the United Nations confided to neutral nations might tomorrow-we would like to hope even today-resolve this terrible question.' Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration. ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG. LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, To PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, JANUARY 31, 1966 CONTAINING TEXT OF U.S. RESOLUTION OF 1966 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As a supplement to my letter to you of this date, requesting that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Vietnam, I submit herewith a draft resolution which I request be circulated as a Security Council document. Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration. Sincerely yours, ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG. 1 U.S. Mission to the United Nations press release No. 4799 dated Jan. 31, 1966. "The Security Council, "Deeply concerned at the continuation of hostilities in Viet-Nam. "Mindful of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, "Noting that the provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 have not been implemented, "Desirous of contributing to a peaceful and honourable settlement of the conflict in Viet-Nam, “Recognizing the right of all peoples, including those in Viet-Nam to selfdetermination, "1. Calls for immediate discussions without pre-conditions at on date, among the appropriate interested Governments to arrange a conference looking towards the application of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 and the establishment of a durable peace in South-East Asia; "2. Recommends that the first order of business of such a conference be arrangements for a cessation of hostilities under effective supervision; "3. Offers to assist in achieving the purposes of this resolution by all appropriate means, including the provision of arbitrators or mediators; "4. Calls on all concerned to co-operate fully in the implementation of this resolution; "5. Requests the Secretary-General to assist as appropriate in the implementation of this resolution.' COMMITTEE SOUGHT CONGRESSMAN BINGHAM'S VIEWS Senator MORSE. In introducing Congressman Bingham, I want to say that he is not appearing at his request but at our request. He is appearing because the Foreign Relations Committee has a very high respect and regard for his expertise in this field. Even before he became a Congressman he was a delegate to the United Nations. He has taken a long-standing interest in the problems of foreign affairs. We felt that he was especially qualified to give us the benefit of his views in regard to the value that the U.N. intervention at the request of the United States through a U.S. resolution would have in furthering the hope and the possibility of establishing an order of peace in the Southeast Asia area through the application of the rules of law instead of the application of the military might. I want to say, Congressman, that we appreciate very much your attendance as a witness before us, and we hope that you will give us the advantage of your views bearing not only upon your work as a Congressman, but your activities even prior to the time you came to Congress. However, you may proceed in your own way and whatever you present to the record will be very much appreciated. STATEMENT OF HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, A U.S. Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for those kind words, and I would like to say it is a pleasure to be back before this great committee. I think the first occasion that I had to testify before this committee was 1952. It seems quite a long way back. Mr. Chairman, I have a short prepared statement, and if it is agreeable, I would like to read it, but, perhaps, interrupt with additional comments as I go along, if that is all right. Senator MORSE. That will be very satisfactory. Mr. BINGHAM. I would like to again apologize for being late due to a misunderstanding of the time. Senator MORSE. You owe us no apology at all. We owe you one for not making our instructions clear. Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, my first comments would have to do with Senate Concurrent Resolution 44 which you introduced September 11. Sept I certainly welcome the introduction of this resolution, and I would welcome its passage by the Congress simply because, in my judgment, almost any step that would tend to move the U.S. Government out of its present locked-in position on Vietnam would be helpful. RESERVATIONS CONCERNING TERMS OF S. CON. RES. 44 I have not joined in introducing this particular resolution in the House, however, because I do have certain reservations concerning its terms. First of all, while I agree that at some future point the United Nations might be immensely useful in regard to achieving permanent peace in Vietnam, I do share the doubts expressed by Secretary General U Thant and many others as to the U.N.'s potential usefulness at the present time as long as there remains a sharp division between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to the problem. I think it is fair to say that the Security Council has never been able to arrive at useful conclusions when the great powers were in sharp disagreement, with the exception, of course, of the Korea case when the Soviet Union was not sitting in the Council. I think it is fair to add to that that this was the intention at San Francisco that the Security Council would have to act in accordance with an agreed position on the part of all the great powers. Second, I venture to question whether the advance commitment by the United States to abide by the decision of the Security Council, as suggested in Resolution 44, offers a realistic approach. Various questions arise in this connection. For example, is it intended that the Ünited States should agree in advance not to exercise its power of veto? From what the chairman just said, I would take it that that was so, and I would assume that that would be so because if such a waiver was not intended, then the offer to abide by the decision would be meaningless because no decision can be taken if the United States votes "No." If we then assume that it is intended that the United States should offer to surrender its power of veto, is it also intended that the United States should not take part in the debate or otherwise seek to influence other members of the Council to adopt a resolution that would be compatible with the U.S. position? For the United States to waive its right to do this would seem almost masochistic. Yet if it does enter into the debate and use its influence in the normal way, it could probably persuade enough members of the Security Council to adopt a position favorable to its point of view to prevent the taking of an adverse decision. It has always been able to do this in the past on other matters. We have never yet had to use the veto in the Security Council simply because not because we would not use it if we had to, but simply because we have been able when we opposed resolutions to |