that if the evidence, the importance, and the distance of the objects be equal, the latter will be greater than the former The reason, I imagine, is, we are conscious, that as every moment, the future, which seems placed before us, is ap proaching, and the past, which lies, as it were, behind, is retiring, our nearness or relation to the one constantly increaseth as the other decreaseth. There is something like attraction in the first case, and repulsion in the second. This tends to interest us more in the future than in the past, and consequently to the present view aggrandizes the one and diminishes the other.

What, nevertheless, gives the past a very considerable advantage, is its being generally susceptible of much stronger evidence than the future. The lights of the mind are, if I may so express myself, in an opposite situation to the lights of the body. These discover clearly the prospect lying before us, but not the ground we have already passed. By the memory, on the contrary, that great luminary of the mind, things past are exhibited in retrospect: we have no correspondent faculty to irradiate the future; and even in matters which fall not within the reach of our memory, past events are often clearly discoverable by testimony, and by effects at present existing, whereas we have nothing equivalent to found our arguments upon in reasoning about things to come. It is for this reason that the future is considered as the province of conjecture and uncertainty.

PART V. Connexion of Place.

Local connexion, the fifth in the above enumeration, hath a more powerful effect than proximity of time. Duration and space are two things (call them entities, or attributes, or what you please), in some respects the most like, and in some respects the most unlike to one another. They resemble in continuity, divisibility, infinity, in their being deemed essential to the existence of other things, and in the doubts that have been raised as to their having a real or independent existence of their own. They differ in that the latter is permanent, whereas the very essence of the former consisteth in transitoriness; the parts of the one are all successive, of the other all coexistent. The greater portions of time are all distinguished by the memorable things which have been transacted in them, the smaller portions by the revolutions "of the heavenly bodies; the portions of place, great and small (for we do not here consider the regions of the fixed stars and planets), are distinguished by the various tracts of land and water into which the earth is divided and subdivided; the one distinction intelligible, the other sensible; the one chiefly known to the inquisitive, the other, in a great measure, obvious to all.

Hence perhaps it arises that the latter is considered as a firmer ground of relation than the former. Who is not more curious to know the notable transactions which have happened in his own country from the earliest antiquity, than to be acquainted with those which have happened in the remotest regions of the globe, during the century wherein he lives? It must be owned, however, that the former circumstance is more frequently aided by that of personal relation than the latter. Connexion of place not only includes vicinage, but every other local relation, such as being in a province under the same government with us, in a state that is in alliance with us, in a country well known to us, and the like. Of the influence of this connexion in operating on our passions, we have daily proofs. With how much indifference, at least with how slight and transient emotion, do we read in newspapers the accounts of the most deplorable accidents in countries distant and unknown? How much, on the contrary, are we alarmed and agitated on being informed that any such accident hath happened in our neighbourhood, and that even though we be totally unacquainted with the persons concerned?

PART VI. Relation to the Persons concerned.

Still greater is the power of relation to the persons concerned, which was the sixth circumstance mentioned, as this tie is more direct than that which attacheth us to the scene of action. It is the persons, not the place, that are the immediate objects of the passions love or hatred, pity or anger, envy or contempt. Relation to the actors commonly produ ces an effect contrary to that produced by relation to the sufferers, the first in extenuation, the second in aggravation of the crime alleged. The first makes for the apologist, the second for the accuser. This, I say, is commonly the case, not always. A remote relation to the actors, when the offence is heinous, especially if the sufferers be more nearly related, will sometimes rather aggravate than extenuate the guilt in our estimation. But it is impossible, with any precision, to reduce these effects to rules, so much depending on the different tempers and sentiments of different audiences. Personal relations are of various kinds. Some have generally greater influence than others; some, again, have greater influence with one person, others with another. They are consanguinity, affinity, friendship, acquaintance, being fellowcitizens, countrymen, of the same surname, language, reli gion, occupation, and innumerable others.

PART VII. Interest in the Consequences.

But of all the connexi、e circumstances, the most powerful is interest, which is the last. Of all relations, personal relation, by bringing the object very near, most enlivens that sym

pathy which attacheth us to the concerns of others; interest in the effects brings the object, if I may say so, into contact with us, and makes the mind cling to it as a concern of its own. Sympathy is but a reflected feeling, and therefore, in ordinary cases, must be weaker than the original. Though the mirror be ever so true, a lover will not be obliged to it for presenting him with the figure of his mistress when he hath an opportunity of gazing on her person; nor will the orator place his chief confidence in the assistance of the social and sympathetic affections, when he hath it in his power to arm the selfish.

Men universally, from a just conception of the difference, have, when self is concerned, given a different name to what seems originally the same passion in a higher degree. Injury, to whomsoever offered, is to every man that observes it, and whose sense of right is not debauched by vicious practice, the natural object of indignation. Indignation always implies resentment, or a desire of retaliating on the injurious person, so far, at least, as to make him repent the wrong he hath committed. This indignation in the person injured is, from our knowledge of mankind, supposed to be, not, indeed, universally, but generally, so much stronger, that it ought to be distinguished by another appellation, and is accordingly denominated revenge. In like manner, beneficence, on whomsoever exercised, is the natural object of our love: love always implies benevolence, or a desire of promoting the happiness of the beneficent person; but this passion in the person benefited is conceived to be so much greater, and to infer so strong an obligation to a return of good offices to his benefactor, that it merits to be distinguished by the title gratitude. Now, by this circumstance of interest in the effects, the speaker, from engaging pity in his favour, can proceed to operate on a more powerful principle, self-preservation. The benevolence of his hearers he can work up into gratitude, their indignation into

revenge.

The two last-mentioned circumstances, personal relation and interest, are not without influence, as was hinted in the enumeration, though they regard the speaker only, and not the hearers. The reason is, a person present with us, whom we see and hear, and who, by words, and looks, and gestures, gives the liveliest signs of his feelings, has the surest and most immediate claim upon our sympathy. We become infected with his passions. We are hurried along by them, and not allowed leisure to distinguish between his relation and our relation, his interest and our interest.

SECTION VI.

OTHER PASSIONS, AS WELL AS MORAL SENTIMENTS, USEFUL AUXILIARIES.

So much for those circumstances in the object presented

by the speaker which serve to awaken and inflame the passions of the hearers.* But when a passion is once raised,

*To illustrate most of the preceding circumstances, and show the manner of applying them, I shall take an example from Cicero's last oration against Verres, where, after relating the crucifixion of Gavius, a Roman citizen, he exclaims, 1. "O nomen dulce libertatis! ô jus eximium nostræ civitatis! ô lex Porcia legesque Sempronia! ô graviter desiderata et aliquando reddita plebi Romanæ tribunitia potestas. 2. Huccine tandem omnia reciderunt, ut civis Romanus in provincia populi Romani, in oppido fœderatorum, ab eo qui beneficio populi Romani fasceis et secureis, haberet, deligatus in foro virgis cæderetur?"-"3. Sed quid ego plura de Gavio? quasi tu Gavio tum fueris infestus, ac non nomini, generi, juri civium hostis, non illi inquam homini, sed causæ communi libertatis inimicus fuisti. 4. Quid enim attinuit, cum Mamertini more atque instituto suo, crucem fixissent post urbem, in via Pompeia; te jubere in ea parte figere, quæ ad fretum spectat; et hoc addere, quod negare nullo modo potes, quod omnibus audientibus dixisti palam, te idcirco illum locum deligere, ut elle qui se civem Romanum esse diceret, ex cruce Italiam cernere, ac domum suam prospicere posset? 5. Itaque illa crux sola, judices, post conditam Messanam, illo in loco fixa est. 6. Italiæ conspectus ad eam rem ab isto delectus est, ut ille in dolore cruciatuque moriens, perangusto freto divisa servitutis ac libertatis jura cognosceret: Italia autem alumnum suum, servitutis extremo summoque supplicio affectum videret. 7. Facinus est vincire civem Romanum, scelus verberare, prope parricidium necare, quid dicam, in crucem tollere? verbo satis digno tam nefaria res appellari nullo modo potest. 8. Non fuit his omnibus iste contentus: Spectet, inquit, patriam, in conspectu legum libertatisque moriatur. 9. Non tu hoc loco Gavium, non unam hominem, nescio quem, civem Romanum, sed communem libertatis et civitatis causam in illum cruciatum et crucem egisti. 10. Jam vero videte hominis audaciam; Nonne enim graviter tulisse arbitramini, quod illam civibus Romanis crucem non posset in foro, non in comitio, non in rostris defigere. 11. Quod enem his locis in provincia sua celebritate simillimum, regione proximum potuit, elegit. 12. Monumentum sceleris― audaciæque suæ voluit esse in conspectu Italiæ, prætervictione omnium qui ultro citroque navigarent."-" 13. Paulo ante, judices, lacrymas in morte misera atque indignissima navarchorum non tenebamus: et rectè ac merito sociorum innocentium miseriâ cummovebamur. 14. Quid nunc in nostro sanguine tandem facere debemus? nam civium Romanorum sanguis conjunctus existimandus est."-" 15. Omnes hoc loco cives Romani, et qui adsunt et qui ubicunque sunt, vestram severitatem desiderant, vestram fidem implorant, vestrum auxilium requirunt. 16. Omnia sua jura, commoda, auxilia, totam denique libertatem in vestris sententiis versari arbitrantur." I shall point out the pathetic circumstances exemplified in this passage, ob serving the order wherein they were enumerated. I have numbered the sentences in the quotation to prevent repetition in referring to them. It must be remarked, first of all, that in judiciary orations, such as this, the proper place for plausibility is the narration; for probability, the confirmation or proof: the other five, though generally admissible into either of those places, shine principally in the peroration. I shall show how the orator hath availed himself of these in the passage now cited. First, importance; and that first in respect of the enormity of the action, No. 7; of the disposition of the actor, No. 3, 9, 10; ar d to render probable what might otherwise appear merely conjectural, ND. 4, 5, 8, 11, 12; in respect of consequences, their greatness, No. 1, 2; where the crime is most artfully, though implicitly, represented as subversive of all that was dear to them, liberty, the right of citizens, their most valuable laws, and that idol of the people, the tribunitian power; their extent, No. 15, 16. Secondly, proximity of time; there is but an insinuation of this circumstance in the word tandem, No. 2. There are two reasons which probably induced the orator in this particular to be

there are also other means by which it may be kept alive, and even augmented. Other passions or dispositions may be called in as auxiliaries. Nothing is more efficacious in this respect than a sense of justice, a sense of public utility, a sense of glory; and nothing conduceth more to operate on these than the sentiments of sages whose wisdom we venerate, the example of heroes whose exploits we admire. I shall conclude what relates to the exciting of passion when I have remarked that pleading the importance and the other pathetic circumstances, or pleading the authority of opinions or precedents, is usually considered, and aptly enough, as being likewise a species of reasoning.

This concession, however, doth not imply, that by any reasoning we are ever taught that such an object ought to awaken such a passion. This we must learn originally from

so sparing. One is, the recency of the crime, as of the criminal's pretorship, was notorious; the other and the weighter is, that of all relations this is the weakest; and even what influence it hath, reflection serves rather to correct than to confirm. In appearing to lay stress on so slight a circumstance a speaker displays rather penury of matter than abundance. It is better, therefore, in most cases, to suggest it, as it were by accident, than to insist on it as of design. It deserves also to be remarked, that the word here employed is very emphatical, as it conveys, at the same time, a tacit comparison of their so recent degeneracy with the freedom, security, and glory which they had long enjoyed. The same word is again introduced, No. 14, to the same intent. Thirdly, local connexion; in respect of vicinage, how affectingly, though indirectly, is it touched, No. 4, 6, 8, 11, 12? Indirectly, for reasons similar to those mentioned on the circumstance of time; as to other local connexions, No. 2, "in provincia populi Romani, in oppido fæderatorum." Fourthly, personal relation; first of the perpetrator, No. 2, "ab eo qui beneficio," &c. : his crime, therefore, more attrocious and ungrate ful, the most sacred rights violated by one who ought to have protected them; next of the sufferer, No. 2, " civis Romanus." This is most pathetically urged, and by a comparison introduced, greatly heightened, No. 13, 14. Fifthly, the interest; which not the hearers only, but all who bear the Roman name, have in the consequences, No. 15, 16. We see in the above example with what uncommon address and delicacy those circumstances ought to be sometimes blended, sometimes but insinuated, sometimes, on the contrary, warmly urged, sometimes shaded a little, that the art may be concealed; and, in brief, the whole conducted so as that nothing material may be omitted, that every sentiment may easily follow that which precedes, and usher that which follows it, and that everything said may appear to be the language of pure nature. The art of the rhetorician, like that of the philosopher, analytical; the art of the orator is synthetical. The former acts the part of the skilful anatomist, who, by removing the teguments, and nicely separating the parts, presents us with views at once naked, distinct, and hideous, now of the structure of the bones, now of the muscles and tendons, now of the arteries and veins, now of the bowels, now of the brain and nervous system. The latter imitates Nature in the constructing of her work, who with wonderful symmetry unites the various organs, adapts them to their respective uses, and covers all with a decent veil, the skin. Thus, though she hide entirely the more minute and the interior parts, and show not to equal advantage even the articulations of the limbs and the adjustment of the larger members, adds inexpressible beauty, and strength, and energy to the whole.