to conclude, in ordinary cases at least, that the opinions of such persons were formed under the influence of an immoral bias, and therefore, that they themselves partake of the nature of immorality.

6. "The very nature of the argument proposed, renders it extremely difficult to deduce from it a satisfactory inference. If to judge respecting the conduct of men, even in single cases, demand much care and knowledge, far more requisite are these qualifications when sentence is to be passed upon their general character. Who, indeed, is so intimately acquainted with the various denominations of Christians, as to form a decision upon this point, that shall not be liable to the imputation of partiality, or of rashness ?"'* That care and knowledge are necessary, in such a comparison, I shall not dispute; and, if I have betrayed my want of either, I presume it is capable of being exposed: but, that the thing itself is impracticable, I cannot admit. It is not impossible to discover who, in general, are serious, conscientious, and pious men, and who they are that indulge in dissipation and folly. The observation of Mr. Kentish, if it prove any thing, proves that the moral tendency of a doctrine is no proper criterion of its truth. Yet he acknowledges, that" In religion the maxim, Ye shall know them by their fruits, is a maxim, unquestionably, of high authority, evident reason, and familiar application." How can these things consist together? If it be of "familiar application," it cannot be "extremely difficult," nor require any extraordinary degree of understanding to apply it. Let there be what difficulty there may, however, in this case, my work, so far as related to facts, was done ready to my hand. Dr. Priestley, Mr. Belsham, and Mrs. Barbauld, were my authorities for the want of regard to practical religion amongst Rational Caristians: writers whom Mr. Kentish will not accuse of the want of either " care or knowledge ;" and to whom he will not, in this cause, impute either" partiality or rashness."

It has been suggested, by some who are friendly to the cause of Socinianism, though not professed Socinians, that I have made an unfair use of a few concessions; and that a similar use might be

made of the concessions of many of the Puritans, who, in their day, lamented the imperfections and degeneracy of their own people. If Dr. Priestley and his brethren had barely acknowledged, that there were great defects amongst their people when compar, ed with the primitive Christians, or with what they ought to be, this, I confess, had been no more than what Puritan writers have done, and the writers of every other denomination of Christians might have done; and such acknowledgments ought not to have been improved against them. But, who, beside themselves, have ever professed to hold a set of principles, to the discernment of which an indifference to religion in general was favourable; a system which those who were most indifferent to the practice of religion were the first, and serious Christians the last, to embrace? Who beside themselves, have been reduced, by facts which they could not deny, to such dire necessity?

From the foregoing introductory observations, Mr. Kentish proceeds to the body of his discourse, which he divides into four heads of inquiry. "I. What is the tendency of the Unitarian doctrine with respect to the cultivation and exercise of the divine, the social, and the personal virtues? II. What assistance, support, and consolation it affords, in the season of temptation, affliction, and death? III. What is its efficacy in the conversion of profligates, and unbelievers? And IV. Finally, How far is it adapted to promote a veneration for the scriptures, and to fortify our faith in* Christianity?"

1. ON THE DIVINE, THE SOCIAL, AND THE PERSONAL VIRtues. Under the first of these particulars, Mr. Kentish very properly considers "love to God;" and, so far as he attempts an answer to what I have written, I suppose this is to be considered as an answer to my VIIth Letter. The substance of what he advances upon this subject is as follows." We believe, according to the sublime language of the favourite Apostle, that God is love; we consider all his moral excellencies, as justice, truth, and holiness, as modifications of this principle. Happiness we regard as the grand object of his works and dispensations, and conceive of his glory as resulting from the diffusion of this happiness."

"These being our ideas of the Deity, love to him cannot fail to be shed abroad in our hearts. Did we think of him, indeed, as one altogether like unto ourselves, did we imagine that he is vindictive, inexorable, arbitrary, and partial; and did we suppose his glory to be something distinct from the exercise of his goodness; we might experience difficulty in obedience to this first and greatest of the commandments. But, in the contemplation of infinite power, emyloyed to execute designs which proceed from infinite benevolence, and are planned by consummate wisdom, filial affection towards God is naturally enkindled and preserved alive in our breasts."*

On this statement, I would observe, in the first place, that it passes over one very important topic of discussion between us; namely, the doctrine of the atonement. Why is it that Mr. Kentish has passed over this doctrine? He knows that Socinian writers have charged it with implying the natural implacability of God; a charge, against which I have attempted to defend it. Have I not a right to conclude, from Mr. Kentish's silence on this head, that he feels the ground to be untenable?

Mr. Kentish has not only declined the discussion of one of the most important subjects, but those topics which have fallen under his notice, are stated with great unfairness. His account of my sentiments, respecting the vindictive character of God, is marked by the grossest misrepresentation. I had carefully explained the term vindictive, when applied to the divine conduct in the punishment of sin, by observing, that "it is very common for people, when they speak of vindictive punishment, to mean that kind of punishment which is inflicted from a wrathful disposition, or a disposition to punish for the pleaure of punishing. Now, if this be the meaning of our opponents, we have no dispute with them. We We do not suppose the Almighty to punish sinners for the sake of putting them to pain. Vindictive punishment, as it is here defended, stands opposed to that punishment which is merely corrective. The one is exercised for the good of the party; the other not so, but for the good of the community." (Letter VII.)

*Pages 11, 12.

Now, though Mr. Kentish must have observed this statement, yet he has suffered himself to write as follows:-" Did we imagine that God is vindictive, inexorable, arbitrary, and partial; or did we suppose his glory to be something distinct from the exercise of his goodness; we might experience difficulty in obedience to this first and greatest of the commandments."* As a proof, it should seem, that these were my sentiments, Mr. Kentish refers to page 119, of the second edition of my Letters, where I have acknowledged, that there is a mixture of the vindictive in the Calvinistic system. But have I not also, in the same page, so explained my meaning as to reject those offensive ideas which Mr. Kentish has introduced in connexion with it? Why did he hold up my acknowledgment, concerning the vindictive character of God, without, at the same time, holding up that sense of it in which I professed to defend it? Or, if he might think himself excused from this, why did he connect such terms with it as must exhibit it in a different and contrary sense, even that very sense in which I had opposed it? I cannot but consider this as disingenuous; and as greatly resembling the conduct of certain Deists, who, in their attacks upon Christianity, choose first to dress it up in the babits of Popery.

As to the glory of God consisting in the exercise of his goodness, if it be meant of the manifestation of the divine glory, and goodness be put for moral excellence, it is the same thing as that which I have acknowledged; namely, that "the glory of God consists in doing that which shall be best upon the whole :" but, by goodness, Mr. Kentish means merely beneficence, undistinguished beneficence, or the pursuit of ultimate happiness in behalf of every intelligent being in the creation, obedient or rebellious, penitent or impenitent, men or devils. In this sense I allow that the glory of God may be at variance with the happiness of creatures, and I contend, that where it is so, the latter, and not the former, ought to be given up.

Mr. Kentish pleads from "the declaration of the favourite Apostle, God is love," and supposes, that "all his moral excellen

*Pages 11, 12.

cies, as justice, truth, and holiness, are but modifications of this principle." To all this I have no objection, provided the object aimed at be the general good of the moral system. But Mr. Kentish supposes, if God be love, that in all he does he must have the good of every individual in his dominions in view. On this principle he must have destroyed Sodom and Gomorrha, Cain, and Balaam, and Saul, and Judas; and all those who, in every age, have lived foaming out their own shame, and to whom, according to the scriptures, is reserved the blackness of darkness for ever, together with Satan and all his rebellious legions, not only as examples to the intelligent creation, but for their own good! Surely this is not a necessary inference from the apostolic declaration. There are other cases, as well as this, in which justice may be a modification of love; but in no case does it require, that an incorrigible offender should not be punished but for his own advantage. The execution of a murderer may be an exercise of pure benevolence to the community, though of just displeasure to the criminal. The removal of a restless, ambitious, intriguing, and bloody-minded prince or princess from the earth, may be a mercy to mankind, and, as such, may be considered as an act worthy of the God of love; but it may not follow that this is accomplished in love to the systematic murderer of the human race. If all the West India islands were to be overwhelmed in some dire distruction, I am not sure that it would not be a mercy to the human species; it would terminate the miseries of thousands, and prevent the annual sacrifice of thousands more; and yet such an event might proceed, not from love, but from just displeasure to guilty individuals. It does not follow, therefore, from any principles with which we are acquainted, that because God is love, he must have the happiness of his incorrigible enemies in view, in all the displeasure which he pours upon them.

In order, it should seem, to obviate this reasoning, Mr. Kentish objects to our "thinking and speaking respecting the measures of the divine administration, as though they were precisely similar