ship, but possibly they intend not to affirm that he is God. And here let Unitarians say on what principles they ascribe to us the doctrine of Christ's divinity, which do not oblige them to ascribe it to the inspired writers. They may say, it is credible that we should hold absurdities, but not that they should. True, but if such language is absurd in our mouths, why not in theirs? Are not they as responsible for the intelligigible use of language as we, and can we safely rely on that as a revelation from God, while we exempt the writers of it from the obligation to use language intelligibly? Would it be a revelation? Unitarians may pronounce the doctrine absurd and contradictory, but let them not be so absurd themselves as to tell us, that that is a revelation from God which reveals nothing; nay rather let them not tell us that God has inspired men to teach us the truth concerning his Son; and left them to use language in a manner, that could have but one possible meaning in the mouths of all other men and yet that it has another possible meaning, in theirs! Is such a principle authorized by reason? Such a principle is indeed as powerful and plastic as scepticism and speculation and unbelief can desire. It cannot fail to blot from the sacred page every doctrine, which the corruption of the heart, the exigencies of theory, or the pride of false philosophy may demand. If any language and all language may be pronounced figurative, and that without a single distinctive mark of its being so, if language be capable in its most perfect actual use, of many possible meanings, if there be no way of determining it to have any definite and certain import, and if any what-you-please, interpretations may be given of it, of what real value are the eternal oracles to man? What is a book from God himself worth, which conveys by no laws of interpretation, the least defiuite meaning? And what are the laws of interpretation by which the voice of God is thus silenced, and the Vol. 3.-No. IV. 25

meaning of God confounded and lost in a chaos of wanton conjectures? Men may adopt such principles, if they will, but let us not be insulted with hearing the mockery of calling it criticism, sound rational criticism.

But the charge which we haye ventured to bring against Unitarians, rests on another fact, of a still more decisive nature. They reject the "obvious sense" of the divine declarations, because their reason pronounces that sense to be absurd, and this in a case, in which reason knows nothing and can prove nothing. Whether the doctrine of the Trinity be absurd is a question of mere philosophy or reason. Such at the same time is the capacity of the human mind, that if the absurdity of the doctrine be as palpable as Unitarians represent it to be, viz. as that three Gods are one God, we should expect at least that a majority of minds would perceive the absurdity. How then has it happened that ninety nine hundredths of the professed followers of Christ have embraced as truth such palpable absurdity? How is it that Unitarians so clearly discern what the rest of the world cannot discover? We know not that they can make any indisputable claim to superiority in natural or acquired capacity, or to any distinguished honesty or diligence in research, which enables them to see absurdity to which the rest of the world are blind. We know not that public opinion has awarded them this preeminence, nor in short that their confident assertions of absurdity are entitled to any more authority over the faith of men, that the equally confident denial of the orthodox. Still it is simply on the authority of their reason that we are called upon to believe that the doctrine of the Trinity is absurd. Before we do this, we shall be free to enquire how much Unitarians infallibly know on the subject and also how much they can prove.

1. Do Unitarians infallibly know that the doctrine of the Trinity is absurd. Mere assertion in argument,

unless it contain a self-evident truth is entitled to no weight. The point then is whether the doctrine be a selfevident absurdity, i. e. is it seen by the mind to be absurd, with the same intuition that we see that a part is not equal to the whole, or that two and two are not five. We grant, if the doctrine were,that God is one and three in the same sense; or that he is one in every possible sense, and yet three in some other sense, it would be a selfevident absurdity. But such is not the doctrine. Trinitarians hold no such ideas; they utterly disclaim them. Unitarians in all their attempts to prove such a doctrine to be absurd, (and we never knew them attempt to prove absurdity on any other) have all the glory of a triumph. But they touch not the doctrine of the Trinity. This doctrine is that God is one in some sense and three in some other sense. Now we affirm that absurdity can no more be charged on the doctrine thus stated, than on the proposition that husband and wife are one in some sense and two in some other sense. We adduce this example simply to shew that when we affirm that God is one in some sense, we do not contradict the affirmation that he is three in some other sense; "the terms being used in senses not really opposed to each other." We "bring together no ideas which are incompatible with each other." And we say that nothing but absolute stupidity can fail to see that such is the fact, and nothing but wilful perverseness can refuse to confess it. The Reviewer has as we have seen virtually made this confession.

Again if the statement of the doc trine involves no absurdity, there is but one other way in which the doctrine can be known to be absurd; viz. by actual knowledge that God is one in every possible sense. This discovery if Unitarians have made it, and can prove that they have made it, is to their purpose. On the contrary, if they have not made it, then they do not know that God is not three in some sense to which their

knowledge does not extend. Suppose then that we should affirm, that in the essence of God there is a threefold distinction, which constitutes dis tinct personality. This affirmation concerning the essence of God, the Reviewer does not know to be false according to his own confession; for he says" of the nature of any being we can know nothing but by the properties or attributes of that being.". Does the Unitarian then possess such infallible knowledge respecting what constitutes the whole nature of the infinite Being, that no evidence of miracles could convince him, that there is a threefold mode of existence in the Godhead, which is a foundation for a threefold personal distinction ? Has he sent his penetrating glance around and through the essence and attributes of the self-existent and infinite God, and so exactly surveyed the lines and limits and nature and mode of his existence, as to know by such discoveries that God is one in every possible sense? Has Mr. C. done this? Has the Reviewer done it? Why then do they talk as if they had? Why do they affirm what can, and what cannot be true of the mode of the divine existence, with the same boldness and confidence as had they actually found out the Almighty to perfection? It is presumption, daring presumption; nor shall we hesitate to pronounce it such, until they prove to us that they have the same knowledge of God, which God has of himself. It is to no purpose to tell us that the doctrine of the Trinity seems to them to be a contradiction that they think it is a contradiction. Of what authority are the opinions and conjectures of mere ignorance? Do they know it to be a contradiction? We put this question to the conscience, and claim an answer without equivocation.

2. We enquire whether Unitarians can prove the doctrine of the Trinity to be absurd. This Mr. C. has attempted, and has we fully believe given to the argument all its plausibility and force. We have already given

this argument on pp. 132, 133. The reader will see if he will recur to it, that its whole strength lies in the philosophical principle, that difference of properties, acts and consciousness is proof of different beings. Now let it be conceded that the representation which Mr. C. has made of the doctrine of the Trinity is just; viz. that the properties, acts and consciousness of one of the sacred persons of the Trinity are not those of another. Let it be also conceded, that difference of properties, acts and consciousness is, in all other cases, satisfactory proof of different beings. The argument then is merely analogical, i. e. since it is admitted that difference of properties &c. proves difference of being with respect to creatures, therefore difference of properties &c. in the persons of the Godhead proves that there are different beings in the Trinity. This is the whole force of Mr. C's. argument, and it lies in the assumption that what we believe of the mode of created existence, must be true of the mode of God's existence. We feel constrained to ask can any man of ordinary intelligence and uprightness rely on a conclusion which rests solely on the assumption, that nothing more substantially pertains to the nature of the self-existent God, than what pertains to the nature of man? But this assumption is all the proof that Mr. C. has furnished that the doctrine of the Trinity is absurd.

But we will further concede that from the mere light of nature, or from what we know of the mode of created existence generally, we should have probable evidence that God does not exist in three persons. Such evidence however as we have seen, (especially if we reflect that it would consist merely in the want of evidence to support the contrary opinion) may be easily and wholly set aside by opposing evidence. Thus in reasoning merely from what we know of the tendency of the human body to dissolution, we should conclude that it would never be resuscitated from the dust to which it returns. But how stands our belief on this point

when God, in a well attested revelation, affirms that it shall be raised incorruptible. So, reasoning from the commonly received principles of philosophy, we should never come to the belief of a Trinity. But what are we to believe should God in a well attested revelation and according to the only true principles of interpreting language, deny the soundness of our reasonings, and declare the personal plurality of the Godhead.

But says Mr. C. "if these things do not imply and constitute three beings we are utterly at a loss to know how three-beings are to be formed.” We have no doubt of the truth of his confession. And what if Mr. C. and his brethren are utterly at a loss to know how three beings are to be formed in any other way than that here supposed. supposed. We have no doubt of their ignorance on this point and we are glad to hear them confess it; and what does their ignorance prove?The fact that Unitarians are "at a loss" on this subject, is just what we are attempting to shew, a fact which surely is entitled to no weight in an argument, which is to set aside the otherwise acknowledged import of the words of God. Does Mr. C. know what constitutes a being? What if God should declare something to be true on this subject, which no philosopher has hitherto thought of, or that something, contrary to what Mr. C. supposes, besides properties, acts and consciousness, enters into the constitution of a being. What, then, becomes of Mr. C.'s philosophy, and the confident conclusions founded upon it? What does reason now say? Does it say that he is authorized to argue from what he does not know, against what God declares? Does it tell him still to rely on the decisions of his philosophy, or rather on his acknowledged ignorance, and, on such authority, to reject what would otherwise be the plain import of the divine declarations? Or does reason say, nothing can be more true than the declarations of the God of truth, and nothing more rational than to believe what he re

veals? Is man to place unhesitating confidence in the decisions of his own reason, and that in a case of absolute ignorance, when the omniscient God decides against him?-Certainly not, says the Unitarian, but you are supposing a case which cannot possibly exist. There are things which God cannot declare to be false. He cannot declare it to be false that a part is less than the whole, nor that difference of properties, &c. does not imply difference of beings.—We readily admit that God cannot declare things to be false which are true. But the question is, whether it be invariably true, that difference of properties constitutes different beings. If the Unitarian affirms this, as he must, in order to preserve plausibility to his argument, he must affirm it, either on the ground of intuition, or on that of reasoning. That he has no intuitive knowledge on the subject, we have already shown. That he can prove the assertion to be true is impossible, because he has no materials for an argument respecting the mode in which any thing exists. Take a portion of matter what is it? You say it is something to which pertains extension, solidity, &c. I ask, are these properties the whole thing? If you say they are, you affirm what you do not know, and what I am at liberty to disbelieve. If you say they are not the whole thing, I ask what is there beside its properties? If you say the substratum, substance or essence of the thing, meaning that in which the properties of the thing subsist,-still, of the nature of this substratum or essence, you have not, nor can you form the remotest conception, except that it is something in which certain properties inhere. Of the truth or falsehood, therefore, of many propositions which might be made concerning it, you have no means of judging.

Again: I ask, what is the soul of man? You say it is something which thinks, wills and acts. But are the properties of the soul, the soul itself? If you affirm this, you affirm what you do not know, and what I have as good

reason to deny as you to affirm. If you say the properties of the soul are not the soul, I ask again, what is the soul? If you say it is that something to which the above attributes belong, I ask again, what is that something? No man can answer. Of the truth or falsehood of many things that might be affirmed of the soul, you have no means of deciding.

Here, then, we come to the application of a principle too undeniable to be questioned, viz.: that the decisions of reason, when we are confessedly in utter ignorance, are entitled to no authority in determining our faith. Suppose one should declare of three separate portions of matter, or of three distinct minds, that, in their essence, or in their mode of existence, the three were in a sense one; could any man, from the treasures of his ignorance, derive arguments to prove the thing to be impossible, and the assertion to be false? Were the assertion to come from God, could we allege the least reason for doubting its truth for a moment? Could we reject the revelation, with the reply.

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we are at a loss" on the subject? We adduce these examples simply to show that, concerning the mode of existence, either of matter or mind, Unitarians, and all other men, are to tally in the dark, and, by reasoning, cannot advance a single step. Mr. C. and the Reviewer have virtually confessed it, by assigning limits to their own knowledge. Now here we plant our feet, and say that no man can prove the doctrine of the Trinity to be absurd. He can derive no materials for an analogical argument from the mode of created existence, and he is shut out absolutely from all acquaintance with the mode of God's existence. According to the concessions of both Mr. C. and the Reviewer, we know nothing of any being beside his attributes; all beyond is a region of darkness; and if God is pleased to shed light upon it, shall we, on the authority of our previous ignorance, demy the discoveries made by such a revelation? Are the doubtful glim

merings of human reason adequate to extinguish the beam imparted from the throne of omniscience? Surely it is a strange principle of reasoning, if God instructs us in a matter, in which we are confessedly in the profoundest ignorance, that this ignorance proves the obvious meaning of the declarations of God to be absurd.

Such, as we suppose, is the ground on which that doctrine is presented to our faith in the Scripture, which is pronounced, by Unitarians, to be "intrinsically incapable of any proof whatever;" and which, as they say, can make no part of a revelation from God, because a revelation from God cannot teach absurdities. We readily grant, were this doctrine known to be absurd, or could it be proved to be absurd, that it could be no part of revelation. In that case, did any portion of the Scriptures clearly teach the doctrine, we might rely on our superior mastership in logic, and reject the inspiration of the writer, or, if the evidence of inspiration should be found too unyielding, we might drown our scruples by an impeachment of the divine perfection. But how stands the case, when the matter of fact is, that the doctrine is not known to be absurd, and cannot be proved to be absurd? What authority is due to the decisions of reason, in a case in which reason knows nothing, and can decide nothing? and what are we to say of those who rely on such decisions of reason, as having a measure of infallibility which precludes contradiction from the omniscient God? Yet such is the course adopted by Unitarians. Solely on the authority of human reason, in a case in which reason knows nothing and can prove nothing, they pronounce the doctrine of the Trinity to be absurd, and reject it as an impossible part of a divine revelation. Nay more, they reject it, when, aside from the fact that ignorance sees fit to charge it with absurdity, it must be acknowledged to be a part of the revelation of God. Now we maintain, that, to yield to the au

thority of reason in such a case, a case in which man is in the profound est ignorance of the nature of the subject whereof he affirms, and, simply on that authority, to set aside the otherwise acknowledged import of the inspired volume, is a most presumptuous reliance on human reason. This is to exalt reason above revelation; and with this offence, we charge Mr. Channing and the Reviewer. They may not predicate absurdity of what they believe God has revealed. This would imply a hardihood of which we do not think them capable. But they do predicate absurdity of that import of divine revelation which they neither know nor can prove to be absurd; and which, aside from the supposed absurdity, must be acknowledged to be the true import. In other words, they discard what God has actually revealed, solely on the authority of their own reason. That they do this ignorantly, is not denied, but such ignorance admits of no vindication. They may persuade themselves that they perceive real absurdity in this doctrine; but such a persuasion, on a subject which, as they know, involves so much that lies beyond their comprehension, must be presumptuous, and cannot be associated with candour and honesty in the investigation of truth. Are we too severe in our allegations? Is not the highest human intellect baffled in every inquiry into the mode of universal existence? is man qualified to go abroad, with an exploring eye, even into the material creation, and to uncover its mysteries? And is there no irreverence in the thought, that the infinite God must so bring himself within the grasp of our comprehension, that the truth or falsehood of his declarations concerning himself may be tested by the independent scrutiny of reason, e'er we will believe those declarations? Is reason competent to denounce, as absurd, and as essentially incredible, the obvious import of God's declarations, on a subject, concerning which reason knows nothing and can prove nothing?