that he always was; that he only needed morally regulating to restore him to his pristine state; and, hence, that we have at the present day, living and walking among us, men as perfect as Adam was when he came from the hand of his Creator, and as many such as there are sanctified Christians.

It would certainly seem, at first view, that our author thus erects a very high standard of Christian perfection, so much so as to dishearten most, if not all, who may attempt to judge of themselves by it. For it is presumed that if the best man upon earth were to ask himself the question, Had God produced me immediately by creative power, would I have been exactly what I now am? he would answer, No. He would be humbled in the dust by the certain conviction that physically, intellectually, and morally, he is but the mere wreck of what human body and mind once were, and that every moment of his gracious acceptance must be for other reasons than any now existing in himself.

But this undue elevation of the standard of perfection is only apparent with our author. Indeed, it will be found, upon examination, that he has lowered instead of raising the standard. He had sagacity enough to see that this fancied perfection existed nowhere upon earth: that admitting the ordinary estimate of Adamic perfection, either his theory was false, or the gospel was a failure. Neither of these alternatives would answer his purpose, and hence nothing remained but to lower the standard to the fact. This Adamic perfection must be made out to be nothing more than what was common to sanctified men, and must be rendered consistent with their undeniable weaknesses, errors, and mistakes. Our readers shall now see how the writer proceeds to accomplish the task which he had thus imposed upon himself:

"What we may call the essential perfection of our first parents in paradise could not, however, have been in any important sense a physical perfection. We cannot for a moment suppose that there is any merely material, physical sense, in which they could be said to be created in the 'likeness' and 'image' of God. It would, however, be aside from our purpose to attempt to ascertain with precision the limits of their physical powers. Limits these powers must have had, even in Adam, who was produced in a state of maturity, directly by the power of his Creator, unless their possessor had been invested with omnipotence. We are not aware that anybody supposes this, and hence, instead of attaching to Adam any undefined or illimitable degree of physical excellence, we cannot but conclude that all his physical powers were limited, and, at least in this sense, imperfect."-P. 23.

"Nor was the essential perfection of our first parents a mental perfection. Adam was created directly by God; and, of course, received mental endowments exactly equal to the office he was to fill, and the

duties he was to perform. He was to give names to all the objects of nature; and was to be an example to all who should rise up around him, of the judicious exercise of the dominion which God intended to give him over all the earth,' and 'over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.' That he should be furnished with mental capacities beyond what was intended for his sons, is, therefore, no more wonderful than that God has, from time to time, in the history of the world, endowed particular men with extraordinary powers for the accomplishment of his great purposes. We have no evidence that Eve, who was his equal in all the essential elements of perfection, had any very extraordinary mental endowments. The deception by which she was led to sin would rather indicate a want of great intellectual acuteness, and that even on a question of morals."-Pp. 24, 25.

"But if, as we have concluded, the 'likeness' and 'image of God,' in which our first parents were created, was irrespective of intellectual power, consisting only in 'righteousness and true holiness,' and embracing only the 'knowledge' requisite to the correct perception of moral truth, then all is plain."

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Those, therefore, who elevate their conceptions of a perfect human nature so high as to divest it of human appetites and of human affections, and to free it from the liability of error in judging and acting, do it without any warrant from Scripture, or support from sound reason." -Pp. 25, 26.

"Even they, [our first parents,] as we have seen, must have been imperfect in many important respects."-P. 123.

"We can conceive of no other perfection than such a moral perfection as we have here defined, suited to a being of limited powers. And again, this view, to our mind, furnishes the only true basis for growth in human perfection. Adam's younger son would have been as essentially perfect as his father; and yet, with every development of mental power, and with every acquisition of knowledge, he might, as did the infant Jesus, have grown in favor with God' as well as 'with man.' These seem to be the replies which psychological science gives to our interrogatories touching this matter."-Pp. 26, 27.

We must here express our surprise that a man of philosophical discrimination should claim the above as a psychological argument. Let the reader carefully examine these extracts and then turn to the book, if he has it, and see if he can find a place in which certain well-defined and settled metaphysical truths are stated, and then these conclusions logically deduced from them; or where we are shown the reasons of these results in any mental power or phenomenon whatever! The fact is, there is no such thing in the text, and this is not the last time our readers are destined to meet with this surprise.

But the point of special interest is the true bearing of these arguments upon the leading object of the writer, namely, the practicability of Adamic perfection. Has he succeeded in the attempt

to bring down this primeval standard to the highest attainable excellence under the gospel dispensation? He denies to Adam "physical perfection,"-and upon what grounds? Why, merely because his physical powers were limited in extent: because he was not omnipotent. And for the same reason he denies him "mental perfection." But he claims for him "moral perfection," merely upon the strength of the negative argument. As much as to say he had some kind of perfection, but it was not "physical" nor "mental," therefore it must have been "moral." But ought he not, as a philosopher, to be aware that in denying him mental, he had denied him moral, perfection also? What is to be the seat of this moral perfection, if not mind? He must refer to the perfection of powers alone, for he will not allow that moral imperfection is anything but the derangement of the powers of mind. And would he not admit that these moral powers were imperfect in the same sense with the "physical" and "mental," that is, limited in extent? He certainly must do so, and hence he has furnished the means of destruction to his own fabric.

It will be admitted strange, that this gentleman did not correct his errors at this point, by availing himself of the palpable distinction between perfection in character and perfection in extent. But for the influence of his speculative opinion, and the evident impossibility of proving our imperfections upon Adam in any other way, he certainly must have done so. We claim perfection in kind for Adam, physical and mental; and in mental we include moral perfection. The proof is in the nature of God and in revelation. A being of unlimited power, wisdom, and goodness, made a human body and breathed into it a living soul. Were there any defects in the workmanship of such an Architect? Surely not. In every particular it must have been perfect. Not only was the body in every organ and tissue complete, but every function was true to the design of the great Intelligence that formed it. The mind, in its power to know, and think, and feel, and will, met its precise design. It had the capability of moral distinctions, of moral impulsions, and moral retributions, without a defect. God had exerted his holy power to produce such capabilities, and he must have succeeded. No corruptions weakened or defiled this pure moral nature, no fell disease preyed upon his body. "Good," all good, "very good.” Now, can this author question this? And can he claim any such perfection for any man now living? Let it be marked that perfection in extent is not the question. This is not predicable of any finite being. However earnestly it may have been argued in this "Philosophy," it is not, and cannot be, a question.

But another attempt to accommodate this speculative opinion is found in his discussion of the subject of "temptation." His views upon this point are thus defined:

"Where, then, shall we find the element in question? [Demand for resistance.] It is, doubtless, to be found (in such a temptation as we are considering) in the conscious tendency of the appetite to seek its gratification in the forbidden object."

"The appetite being but a modification of desire, the same element may be found in any temptation to evil; and its general designation would be a conscious tendency of some of the desires to seek gratification in a forbidden object."-P. 19.

Here is the doctrine plainly avowed that the desire to yield to a solicitation to evil is essential to temptation. It is hence claimed that such desire may exist in the mind of an entirely sanctified Christian, and indicate no sin or need of atonement, if the will decide against it. This is the standard for a holy man under the Christian scheme; and, of course, as our author has undertaken to assert the identity of perfection before and after the fall, he must show that our first parents were capable of a "desire to seek gratification in a forbidden object" while they retained their original purity, and that the fall occurred only when this desire obtained the consent of the will. The writer shall speak for himself :

"Suppose that Eve, as she walks through the garden, has her attention attracted by the forbidden tree; and, perceiving that it was pleasant to the eyes,' pauses to admire the beauty of its foliage and of the rich fruit which hangs from its boughs, till she is diverted by the melody proceeding from some neighboring bower, or by the approach of her companion in bliss, or some heavenly visitant. Here the forbidden tree has been contemplated with emotions of beauty, and yet they have furnished no occasion for resistance. There was nothing as yet to resist; since, undoubtedly, it was among the most beautiful trees of the garden, and was one of the works of God which she had not been prohibited from looking upon, but only from tasting. Suppose, again, that her attention is attracted by the beauties of this tree, as she is admiring all the works of its Creator, and she tarries beneath its shade till hunger begins to steal upon her; when her mind turns to the clusters of which she has often eaten, and she seeks her sole companion, and with him sits down to the rich provision afforded by the other trees of the garden. The woman saw that the tree was good for food.' We e may even suppose then, in this case, that the forbidden fruit is the immediate occasion of thus exciting the appetite; and yet there is furnished no occasion for resistance, since the appetite here seeks its gratification only in allowable objects. The most that from the nature of the case could be even here suggested, would be the idea of possible danger; in which case her pure nature might have shrunk from the further contemplation of the tempting object, or have put itself

into an attitude of repellency or defense. And even this supposed idea of possible danger must have had its origin solely in the original admonition, and not in her experience, unless she had already received some other evidence than we have as yet supposed of the seducing influence of the forbidden tree.

"But suppose, again, that she has had such experience of its seducing power; and, as the consequence of this, that the beauty of the forbidden tree has become abhorrent to her moral sensibilities, so that she looks upon its attractions only with loathing. Here, again, there is no occasion for resistance; all she has to do is to yield to the feelings of repulsion which she instinctively has.

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In tracing this chain we must, then, somewhere have omitted a link. We have as yet found no demand for resistance; consequently, no temptation—at least, no such temptation as could naturally lead to actual transgression. We have not even seen any natural origin of such a sense of danger, as could produce the abhorrence and loathing we have in this last case supposed."-Pp. 17-19.

We have seen how this link is supplied. It is "the conscious tendency to seek its gratification in the forbidden object." Now, with all deference to the talents of this author, we must say that this whole "theory of temptation" is one of the most perfect specimens of learned nonsense we have ever seen. What are the facts to be accounted for? Why, simply, how a holy being entirely disposed to do right should be tempted to do wrong; and how such a being can become a sinner. How should a boy tempt another to become a truant? Ask him, certainly, and perhaps urge him; but if he does not wish to go, he is not tempted! If he does not resist himself, he has nothing to resist. His decided and persevering resistance to his tempter was no resistance at all, because he did not wish to disobey his father! The devil tempts a man in the sense of solicitation to evil. The man feels no inclination to comply. His pure spirit shrinks with horror from the very idea of sin, and he refuses faithfully and perseveringly; but this, says our author, is no "temptation," because the man had no conscious desire to seek his gratification in forbidden objects." There was nothing to resist because he had not himself to resist! What an unaccountable error then in the divine command, "Resist the devil and he will flee from you." It should have been, "Resist yourself when the devil approaches, for if you are tempted you will certainly have a conscious desire to yield, and this desire is the only thing that can call for resistance!" If it is the legitimate effect of metaphysical speculations in theology thus to mystify a perfectly plain subject, we are sure no one would wish to submit to their guidance. We will only add, that if this theory is true at all, it is universally true. If a desire of gratification in the forbidden object is essen

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