Comparing Political Corruption and ClientelismJunichi Kawata Routledge, 2 mar 2017 - 248 pagine Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 6-10 di 90
Pagina 1882
... political parties, traditional examples of clientelism as observed in the relationship between landlords and farmers, developed into neo-clientelism. A typical example of this is the type of clientelism where political parties, and the ...
... political parties, traditional examples of clientelism as observed in the relationship between landlords and farmers, developed into neo-clientelism. A typical example of this is the type of clientelism where political parties, and the ...
Pagina 1884
... parties is called a ' limited exchange ' . In these terms , clientelism is the long - term exchange between two parties . Therefore , it is a kind of ' limited exchange ' , not a ' generalized exchange ' . So , clientelism should be ...
... parties is called a ' limited exchange ' . In these terms , clientelism is the long - term exchange between two parties . Therefore , it is a kind of ' limited exchange ' , not a ' generalized exchange ' . So , clientelism should be ...
Pagina 1886
... parties . Therefore , exercising authority associated with this kind of relationship has the effect of interfering with generalized exchanges . Does ' good clientelism ' not exist ? In some cases , clientelistic relationships create ...
... parties . Therefore , exercising authority associated with this kind of relationship has the effect of interfering with generalized exchanges . Does ' good clientelism ' not exist ? In some cases , clientelistic relationships create ...
Pagina 1889
... political corruption is since the early stages ( Bryce , 1921 ; Scott , 1972 ... political corruption in terms of ' morality ' , basic discussions on ... parties in cities of the U.S. were seen as satisfying the social function of ...
... political corruption is since the early stages ( Bryce , 1921 ; Scott , 1972 ... political corruption in terms of ' morality ' , basic discussions on ... parties in cities of the U.S. were seen as satisfying the social function of ...
Pagina 1904
... political parties have cozy relationships with government and the bureaucracy; where enterprises have cozy relationships with politicians and bureaucrats (Bull and Newell, 2003, pp. 239–40). The sixth point to note is that we need to ...
... political parties have cozy relationships with government and the bureaucracy; where enterprises have cozy relationships with politicians and bureaucrats (Bull and Newell, 2003, pp. 239–40). The sixth point to note is that we need to ...
Sommario
1858 | |
1866 | |
1880 | |
1916 | |
Multilevel | 1979 |
Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian | |
The End of the ConservativeReformist Era and | |
Mafia Corrupted Violence and Incivism | |
The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy | |
The Development of Political Clientelism in 20thcentury | |
Index | |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism Junichi Kawata,Junʼichi Kawata Visualizzazione estratti - 2006 |
Parole e frasi comuni
actors administration anti-fraud Arlacchi associations Basilicata benefits bosses bribery bribes bureaucrats cabinet Caciagli candidates cent chapter Christian Democrats civic clientele networks clientelistic CLPR coalition Communist competition corrupt exchanges Cosa Nostra countries DC factions Democracy Democrazia Cristiana Diet members districts economic effectiveness elected electoral entrepreneurs European example Gamson predictions Giovanni Falcone illegal incentives individual institutional Italian Italy Japan Japanese junior Korea La Repubblica largest faction legitimacy Mafia Mafiosi Mezzogiorno ministers ministries monitoring Nakasone Palermo Paris parliamentary particularistic party leaders pentito plurality rule political clientelism political corruption political parties Political Science politicians Porta and Vannucci portfolio allocation president presidential presidential systems public resources reform reformist regional relationships rent-seeking role Rose-Ackerman scandal Sicily social social capital Socialists society Southern Italy strategy structure subsidies Tanaka theories of political Tokyo Tommaso Buscetta transaction vertical vertical limited voters votes